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Abstract: Concentrated poverty in public schools continues to be a leading determinate of the educational opportunities that minority students
receive. Since the effective end of mandatory desegregation, advocates
have lacked legal tools to address it. As an alternative, some advocates and
scholars have attempted to incorporate the concerns of concentrated poverty and racial segregation into educational litigation under state constitutions, but these efforts have been slow to take hold. Thus, all that has remained for students in poor and minority schools is the hope that school
finance litigation could direct sufficient resources to mitigate their plight.
This Article offers another solution. Rather than simply importing concepts from federal desegregation into school finance, this Article articulates a unique theory of equal access to middle-income peers that is solidly
grounded in state constitutional and school finance principles. In particular, it conceptualizes middle-income students as one of the educational resources that school districts allocate. As such, school finance principles of
strategic and equitable distribution of resources apply. This theory is narrower than others and would not directly challenge segregation that exists
between districts, but its narrowness is its doctrinal strength. Moreover, an
empirical study of district-level practices reveals that conventional wisdom
may have underestimated the level of inequality that occurs within districts. The racial inequality in access to middle-income peers within districts is vast and corresponds with dramatic shifts in achievement gaps, a
core indicator of constitutional violations in school finance litigation.
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Introduction
Mandatory racial desegregation has almost run its course,1 voluntary desegregation is subject to significant constitutional limits,2 and
school finance litigation is caught between progressive legal doctrine
and empty state coffers.3 Unfortunately, none of these efforts has come
close to reaching its full potential before experiencing a serious setback.4 Schools are as racially segregated today as they were four decades ago,5 and predominantly poor and minority schools routinely receive thousands of dollars less per pupil than their suburban
counterparts.6 In short, today’s schools are both segregated and unequal.7 Given the severity of today’s segregation and inequality, a racial
achievement gap between whites and minorities equivalent to two years
of learning by the eighth grade is not entirely surprising.8 What is surprising is the dearth of policy and legal solutions to the problem.
Over the last decade, scholars have called for a “fourth wave” of
school finance litigation that would combine racial desegregation and
school finance into a single movement.9 The idea has been that racial
1 Wendy Parker, The Future of School Desegregation, 94 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1157, 1158–59
(2000) (recounting, as early as 2000, the various indicators that desegregation had come to
an end, but empirically demonstrating that numerous consent decrees were still in place
and enforced).
2 See, e.g, Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 710–
11 (2007).
3 See John Dayton et al., Brother, Can You Spare a Dime? Contemplating the Future of School
Funding Litigation in Tough Economic Times, 258 Educ. L. Rep. 937, 954 (2010) (“[C]ourts
will face very difficult challenges in attempting to bridge the growing gap between constitutional ideals and fiscal realities if the General Assembly lacks public support and sufficient resources to fund remedies for school funding inequities and inadequacies.”).
4 See Derek W. Black, The Fatal Flaws of Education Reform: Causal Gaps and Doctrinal
Incoherence 2–3 (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
5 Gary Orfield & Chungmei Lee, The Civil Rights Project at Harvard Univ.,
Brown at 50: King’s Dream or Plessy’s Nightmare? 19 tbl.7 (2004) (showing a resegregation of schools back to 1970s levels).
6 Ross Wiener & Eli Pristoop, How States Shortchange the Districts That Need the Most Help,
in Funding Gaps (Educ. Trust, D.C.), Jan. 1, 2006, at 5, 7 tbl.4.
7 Robert A. Garda, Jr., Coming Full Circle: The Journey from Separate but Equal to Separate
and Unequal Schools, 2 Duke J. Const. L. & Pub. Pol’y 1, 53 (2007) (arguing that the distinction between Plessey v. Ferguson’s enforced segregation and today’s voluntary segregation “will not make a practical difference to our students, however, as our separate schools
will continue to produce disparate educational opportunities for our poor and minority
students” and concluding that school finance litigation, for instance, will counteract it).
8 See Nat’l Ctr. for Educ. Statistics, The Condition of Education 2009, App. A,
at 153 tbl.A-12-2, 157 tbl.A-13-2 (2009).
9 See, e.g., Molly S. McUsic, The Future of Brown v. Board of Education: Economic Integration
of the Public Schools, 117 Harv. L. Rev. 1334, 1355–56 (2004); James E. Ryan, Schools, Race, and
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and/or poverty isolation deprives students of their state constitutional
right to an equal or adequate education.10 As of yet, however, this theory has been slow to spread beyond the one court opinion that recognized it in 1996.11 In fact, only a handful of advocates have even attempted to pursue integration through school finance claims.12
Although the incorporation of integration into state-based concepts of
equity or adequacy could potentially resolve some of the limitations desegregation experienced in federal court,13 the strategy may attempt to
prove too much. Including racial diversity within the concept of an
equal or adequate education could effectively mean that schools across
the board must be integrated. Even if the right was merely to a diverse
environment rather than the racial balance typically pursued in federal
desegregation,14 an affirmative right to diversity under state constitutions would have a wider reach than federal desegregation, as an affirmative right would apply to all racial isolation regardless of its legal
cause or geographic location. The practical result of an affirmative right
to diversity or a prohibition on poverty isolation would be significant
desegregation across school district lines.15 In these respects, state-based
integration claims would challenge the institutional authority and capacity of state courts at a level approaching that of federal desegregation.16
These realities, although not a legitimate basis alone for courts to reject
the claims, may have dissuaded integration theories in school finance
litigation.
Money, 109 Yale L.J. 249, 307–10 (1999); Christopher E. Adams, Comment, Is Economic Integration the Fourth Wave in School Finance Litigation?, 56 Emory L.J. 1613, 1642 (2007).
10 Ryan, supra note 9, at 308.
11 Sheff v. O’Neill, 678 A.2d 1267, 1270–71 (Conn. 1996); see Goodwin Liu, The Parted
Paths of School Desegregation and School Finance Litigation, 24 Law & Ineq. 81, 82–83 (2006).
12 See Hoke Cnty. Bd. of Educ. v. State, 599 S.E.2d 365, 397 (N.C. 2004); Paynter v.
State, 797 N.E.2d 1225, 1226–27 (N.Y. 2003); Sheff, 678 A.2d at 1271; Class Action Complaint at 13–14, NAACP v. Minnesota, No. 27-CV-95-014800 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Sept. 19, 1995)
[hereinafter NAACP Complaint].
13 See, e.g., Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 744–45 (1974) (limiting desegregation to
school district boundaries); Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 205–06 (1973) (limiting
desegregation remedies to acts of intentional segregation).
14 See, e.g., Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 25–28 (1971)
(indicating that statistical disparities from the overall district average are a starting point of
analysis, and affirming the reassignment of students to different schools through altered
attendance zones).
15 See, e.g., Sheff, 678 A.2d at 1290–91; see also Aaron J. Saiger, The School District Boundary
Problem, 42 Urb. Law. 495, 495–96 (2010).
16 See James K. Gooch, Fenced In: Why Sheff v. O’Neill Can’t Save Connecticut’s Inner City
Students, 22 Quinnipiac L. Rev. 395, 438–40 (2004) (discussing how practicalities, particularly crossing the school district boundary, has created serious opposition to the remedy in
Sheff).
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Not all integrative approaches to school finance, however, would
necessarily confront these practical limitations or require significant
expansions of precedent. In particular, this Article articulates a constitutional right to equal access to middle-income peers that operates
most directly at the school district level and carries with it significant
conceptual precedent. The theory is not that students can compel a
state or school district to create racially or socioeconomically integrated
environments where they would not otherwise exist, but that past
school finance decisions provide a basis on which to constrain the distribution of middle-income students within individual school districts.
This constitutional right flows from four basic principles, three of
which already find solid support. First, although routinely referred to as
school finance litigation because additional funding has been the primary remedy litigants have requested, the core holdings in school finance litigation establish constitutional guarantees of equal and quality
educational opportunity that are about far more than money.17 In fact,
the constitutional violation in most cases is not funding inequity itself,
but the substantive and outcome-based inequities that can result from
funding inequity.18 Second, constitutional duties to deliver a quality or
an equal education extend to districts in addition to states.19 To reason
otherwise would afford districts wider constitutional latitude than
states, even though the primary constitutional power and duty itself is
vested with the state. Third, educational constitutional duties include
an obligation of strategic and equitable resource distribution.20 Courts
have recognized that an abundance of resources will not guarantee equitable or quality educational opportunities without a careful and fair
distribution of those resources. This principle is embodied in the very
language of some states’ educational clauses.21
The final conceptual step in a constitutional right to middleincome peers, however, is not as simple as the first three. It requires a
17 See Sheff, 678 A.2d at 1290–91; Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186,
212 (Ky. 1989) (defining the substance of the constitutional right as an adequate education and describing it in noneconomic terms).
18 See, e.g., Leandro v. State, 488 S.E.2d 249, 254 (N.C. 1997).
19 See infra notes 100–127 and accompanying text.
20 See, e.g., Rose, 790 S.W.2d at 189 (requiring an “efficient” school system); Hoke Cnty., 599
S.E.2d at 388–90 (requiring strategic allocation of resources); Tenn. Small Sch. Sys. v.
McWherter, 894 S.W.2d 734, 738–39 (Tenn. 1995) (sanctioning the state’s mandate of fiscal
responsibility on local districts); Pauley v. Kelly, 255 S.E.2d 859, 878 (W. Va. 1979) (prohibiting resource waste and duplication and mandating efficiency).
21 See Ky. Const. § 183 (mandating that the state “provide for an efficient system of
common schools throughout the state”).
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reorientation in thinking about educational resources and segregation.
Legally relevant educational resources tend to be conceptualized as
those things schools can buy, develop, or create that have positive impacts on educational outcomes.22 This conceptualization is overly narrow and ignores reality. Schools enjoy any number of important resources that they do not and cannot buy, such as the communities,
public services, partnerships, and private industries surrounding them
that support the educational environment. The more important and
direct noneconomic resource, however, is a school district’s middleincome students. Common sense and social science indicate that students learn not only from their teachers, but also from their peers.23
Middle-income peers (and their parents), in particular, bring a host of
experiences, outside learning, and high expectations to schools that
positively impact other students in their schools.24 The percentage of
middle income students in a school can be more important to the educational achievement of all students in that school than any other resource or factor.25 Students, regardless of their individual socioeconomic status or race, achieve at higher levels in predominantly middle
class schools and at lower levels in predominantly poor schools.26 In
short, although not a traditional resource that schools can buy, middleincome students are an invaluable resource that exerts significant influence on the achievement of all students.

22 Such a conceptualization is evident through courts’ use of “cost out” studies to design remedies. William S. Koski, Courthouses vs. Statehouses?, 109 Mich. L. Rev. 923, 939
(2011) (reviewing Eric A. Hanushek & Alfred A. Lindseth, Schoolhouses, Courthouses, and Statehouses: Solving the Funding Achievement Puzzle in America’s
Public Schools (2009)); Benjamin Michael Superfine, New Directions in School Funding
and Governance: Moving from Politics to Evidence, 98 Ky. L.J. 653, 664–67 (2009).
23 Richard D. Kahlenberg, All Together Now: Creating Middle-Class Schools
Through Public School Choice 47–76 (2001).
24 Id. at 49–58; Myron Orfield, Choice, Equal Protection, and Metropolitan Integration: The
Hope of the Minneapolis Desegregation Settlement, 24 Law & Ineq. 269, 273 (2006).
25 See James S. Coleman et al., Dep’t of Health, Educ., & Welfare, Equality of
Educational Opportunity 21–22 (1966).
26 Id. at 302–10; Kahlenberg, supra note 23, at 6; UNC Ctr. for Civil Rights, The
Socioeconomic Composition of the Public Schools: A Crucial Consideration in
Student Assignment Policy 1–4 (2005) [hereinafter Socioeconomic Composition of
the Public Schools], available at http://www.law.unc.edu/documents/civilrights/briefs/
charlottereport.pdf; Geoffrey D. Borman & Maritza Dowling, Schools and Inequality: A Multilevel Analysis of Coleman’s Equality of Educational Opportunity Data, 112 Tchrs. C. Rec. 1201,
1201–02 (2010); McUsic, supra note 9, at 1355–56; Laura B. Perry & Andrew McConney,
Does the SES of the School Matter? An Examination of Socioeconomic Status and Student Achievement Using PISA 2003, 112 Tchrs. C. Rec. 1137, 1137–38 (2010).
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Yet, reorienting the concept of educational resources to include
middle-income students, by itself, is not enough. Courts must also reorient their perception of poverty and racial segregation. Poverty and
racial segregation today are perceived as inevitable, beyond the control
of states and districts, and natural.27 Of course, it is true that school districts have almost no control over the total number of middle-income
and poor students in their districts, but they have complete control
over the assignment of those middle-income and poor students who are
enrolled in their districts. Conventional wisdom over the past two decades, however, has been to ignore this basic fact and the problem of
segregation within districts because the most extreme and extensive
segregation exists between districts.28 Although conventional wisdom
may be correct in its assessment of inter-district segregation, it does not
follow that segregation within districts is not occurring or serious.29
To the contrary, this Article’s empirical study of access to middleincome peers reveals that many school districts have the capacity to expose all students to middle-income environments, but instead deny minorities of the experience. Interestingly, the study also uncovers a pattern of many other school districts doing the opposite by providing
minority students equal access to middle-income environments. The
fact that this inequality of access is occurring within the confines of individual school districts, but not others, demonstrates that the current
racially and socioeconomically isolated nature of many districts is not
inevitable. Rather, districts are making choices about how they distribute valuable resources—too often to the disadvantage of minorities.
27 See, e.g., Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 494–95 (1992); Thomas Cnty. NAACP v. City of
Thomasville Sch. Dist., 299 F. Supp. 2d 1340, 1358 (M.D. Ga. 2004); see also Martha R. Mahoney, Segregation, Whiteness, and Transformation, 143 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1659, 1661–62 (1995)
(“[R]ace derives much of its power from seeming to be a natural or biological phenomenon
or, at the very least, a coherent social category. For whites, residential segregation is one of
the forces giving race a ‘natural’ appearance . . . . The appearance that this is ‘the way things
are’ . . . tends to make prevailing patterns of race, ethnicity, power, and the distribution of
privilege appear as features of the natural world.”); john a. powell & Stephen M. Menendian,
Remaking Law: Moving Beyond Enlightenment Jurisprudence, 54 St. Louis U. L.J. 1035, 1095
(2010) (reasoning that old decisions such as Milliken v. Bradley have legitimized segregation).
28 See Sean F. Reardon & John T. Yun, Integrating Neighborhoods, Segregating Schools: The Retreat from School Desegregation in the South, 1990–2000, 81 N.C. L. Rev. 1563, 1575–80 (2003)
(discussing the gravity of interdistrict school segregation and its relationship to housing segregation); see also Charles T. Clotfelter, After Brown: The Rise and Retreat of School
Desegregation 73 tbl.A2.3 (2004) (estimating that sixty-nine percent of segregation in metropolitan areas is due to segregation between districts).
29 Reardon & Yun, supra note 28, at 1575–81 (indicating that the full extent of school
segregation is not attributable to residential or inter-district segregation, as student assignment policies exacerbate the problem).
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Consistent with the literature, this unequal access to middle class
peers also appears to have consequences for minority students’ academic achievement. After identifying the varying levels of equitable and
inequitable access, this Article takes the next step and analyzes whether
racial inequality in access to middle-income peers correlates with any
change in the racial achievement gap. It finds that, in general, those districts with the most inequitable access for minorities also have the largest achievement gaps, whereas districts that provide minorities the most
equitable access have the smallest achievement gaps. Thus, this empirical evidence not only forces a reorientation of how one perceives racial
inequality in student assignments, but suggests that a widespread pattern of segregative student assignments and large achievement gaps persists that would otherwise be inconsistent with a constitutional right to
equal access to middle-income peers.
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I recounts past efforts to
assert segregation-related claims within the context of school finance
litigation and precedent, as well as the scholarly theories supporting
and urging the expansion of these efforts.30 Part I concludes by distinguishing these past efforts from this Article’s theory and explaining the
legal and practical advantages of pursuing intra-district claims of unequal access to middle-income peers.31 Part II offers a full and detailed
explanation of the legal precedent and social science evidence that
would establish a constitutional right to equal access to middle-income
peers.32 Part III describes the methodology and results of this Article’s
empirical analysis of racially unequal access to middle-income peers
and its correlation with changes in the racial achievement gap.33 The
Article concludes by urging that courts and advocates take the relatively
small step of ensuring equal treatment in regard to one of school districts’ most vital resources.
I. Past Challenges to Poverty and Race Segregation
The doctrinal intersection between state constitutional rights to
education and the problem of concentrated poverty is relatively underdeveloped by courts and scholars. To the extent courts and scholars
have addressed the issue at all, they have addressed it only in regard to
segregation between districts, not within them, and the analysis has
30 See infra notes 34–92 and accompanying text.
31 See infra notes 34–92 and accompanying text.
32 See infra notes 93–255 and accompanying text.
33 See infra notes 256–301 and accompanying text.
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been preliminary in most respects. A review of the litigation and literature, however, is helpful in identifying the challenges of pursuing integration theories through state constitutions and why past efforts have
not yet spread widely. For both practical and doctrinal reasons, these
prior theories have faced an uphill battle. But a theory of equal access
to middle-income peers within school districts is distinct from these
past efforts in key respects. First, by definition, this Article’s theory does
not challenge historical school district lines, which have proven to be
sticking points elsewhere. By focusing on current intra-district patterns,
this Article avoids important political, practical, and legal impediments.
Second, recognizing a right to equal access to middle-income peers
does not require the large expansion of precedent that other theories
might. Rather, it arguably only requires the application of existing
precedent to current decisions and patterns within districts. In short,
notwithstanding the past, this Article offers a viable strategy for addressing certain forms of segregation through state educational rights.
A. Litigation Strategies and Outcomes
Racial segregation and concentrated poverty have previously been
addressed almost exclusively through federal school desegregation litigation.34 In most school districts, racial desegregation also led to socioeconomic desegregation.35 As a result, pursuing separate legal theories
to address socioeconomic segregation on its own was never a pressing
concern, particularly during the period when courts were receptive to
racial desegregation claims.36 Changes in federal law, however, eventually limited advocates’ ability to pursue racial desegregation claims.37 In
the 1973 case Keyes v. School District No. 1, the U.S. Supreme Court held
that plaintiffs must establish intentional segregation to justify school
desegregation remedies.38 The significance of this requirement only
grew as time passed and the connection between current segregation
34 See infra notes 35–69 and accompanying text.
35 Much of the academic benefit of racial desegregation was attributable to the fact that it
tended to also reduce the socioeconomic isolation of minority students. See generally Gary
Orfield & Chungmei Lee, The Civil Rights Project at Harvard Univ., Why Segregation Matters: Poverty and Educational Inequality (2005), available at http://bsdweb.
bsdvt.org/district/EquityExcellence/Research/Why_Segreg_Matters.pdf (exploring school
and student segregation by poverty and how it relates to racial inequality); Gary Orfield,
Must We Bus? Segregated Schools and National Policy 69 (1978).
36 See Orfield, supra note 35, at 69.
37 See Keyes, 413 U.S. at 208–10.
38 See id.
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and past discrimination became less clear.39 Moreover, the problem
existed from the outset in many northern districts where schools were
never segregated by law.40
In 1975, two years after Keyes, the Court in Milliken v. Bradley held
that, absent substantial evidence of intentional efforts to segregate students between school districts, school desegregation remedies cannot
extend beyond the boundaries of the primary offending school district.41 The result of these two decisions was to leave untouched any
segregation that could not be precisely connected to intentional discrimination by schools and to protect the rapidly increasing segregation between districts that resulted as whites fled inner-city school districts to escape desegregation.42 Nonetheless, desegregation orders
were effective in dramatically increasing integration for two decades in
many districts, but the withdrawal of federal mandates starting in the
late 1980s allowed even those districts to “resegregate” to levels that resemble those of the late 1960s when desegregation had begun in earnest.43
The period of federal limitations on desegregation coincided with
the increase in state-based theories of educational equity. In fact, desegregation advocates were instrumental in early school finance litigation,
as some believed that equality of funding was as important as racial integration, if not more.44 School finance claims, however, were not predicated on race. They were based on securing resources for disadvantaged students and districts in general, of which minority students and
districts are only a subset.45 The point was to reform state finance structures, not local school district boundaries or school attendance zones.
Thus, racial integration as a remedy was almost entirely irrelevant to
school finance litigation. As racial desegregation became more untenable in federal court, however, desegregation advocates began to consider how they might utilize and build on the success of school finance
39 See, e.g., Pitts, 503 U.S. at 498–99; see also James S. Liebman, Desegregating Politics: “AllOut” School Desegregation Explained, 90 Colum. L. Rev. 1463, 1513–17 (1990).
40 See Keyes, 413 U.S. at 218–19.
41 Milliken, 418 U.S. at 752–53.
42 Erwin Chemerinsky, Separate and Unequal: American Public Education Today, 52 Am. U.
L. Rev. 1461, 1469–70 (2003).
43 Orfield & Lee, supra note 5, at 19 tbl.7.
44 Richard F. Elmore & Milbrey Wallin McLaughlin, Reform and Retrenchment: The Politics of California School Finance Reform 35–36 (1982); see also Christopher R. Lockard, In the Wake of Williams v. State: The Past, Present, and Future of Education
Finance Litigation in California, 57 Hastings L.J. 385, 387 (2005) (noting the work of Derrick Bell, a former desegregation attorney, on early school finance litigation).
45 Ryan, supra note 9, at 252.
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precedent in state court.46 State-based theories could potentially free
desegregation advocates of the problems of proving intentional discrimination and securing desegregation remedies across districts.47
The first and most important of these attempts culminated in the
1996 Connecticut Supreme Court case Sheff v. O’Neill.48 In Sheff, the
plaintiffs made two distinct but interrelated arguments: first, that de
facto segregation violated the state constitution’s guarantee of equal
educational opportunity; and second, that the economic and racial segregation in the state deprived students of an adequate education.49 The
court held that racial segregation, whether intentional or de facto, violated students’ rights to equal educational opportunities, but it rejected
the argument that poverty and racial isolation deprived students of an
adequate education, finding that the plaintiffs had not properly argued
or established the latter point in the lower courts.50 Nothing in the
court’s opinion, however, was inconsistent with recognizing that segregation deprives students of an adequate education in the future. Regardless, the holding in Sheff was encouraging for those considering
similar efforts in other states, but litigation elsewhere has ultimately
been limited and produced mixed results. Only two other significant
litigation efforts have proceeded, and only one has led to a published
opinion.51
The next effort following Sheff was in Minnesota. In 1995, in
NAACP v. Minnesota, the plaintiffs filed a complaint that squarely focused on the barriers to an adequate education created by concentrated
poverty and racial segregation, forcing the issue that Sheff avoided.52
The plaintiffs emphasized that “68 percent of Minneapolis students
46 Susan Eaton, The Children in Room E4: American Education on Trial 88–91
(2007).
47 See Saiger, supra note 15, at 513–14 (describing Sheff as overcoming the school district boundary problem that Milliken created); Gayl Shaw Westerman, The Promise of State
Constitutionalism: Can It Be Fulfilled in Sheff v. O’Neill?, 23 Hastings Const. L.Q. 351, 384–
86 (1996).
48 678 A.2d 1267 (Conn. 1996).
49 Id. at 1302 (Borden, J., dissenting).
50 Id. at 1289 (majority opinion).
51 Plaintiffs in one other instance intervened in a school finance case and claimed
among other things that resegregation in Charlotte, North Carolina was impeding their ability to obtain a sound basic education, but the trial court never took any action in regard to
the claim. Second Amended Complaint by Plaintiff-Intervenors CMS Students and CharlotteMecklenburg NAACP at 3–5, Hoke Cnty. v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., No. 95 CVS
1158 (Wake Cnty. Sup. Ct. Sept. 30, 2005), available at http://www.law.unc.edu/documents/
civilrights/briefs/2ndamendedcomplaint.pdf; see also Paynter, 797 N.E.2d at 1225; NAACP
Complaint, supra note 12, at 2, 9–15.
52 NAACP Complaint, supra note 12, at 2, 9–15.
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were students of color and 66 percent were eligible for free or reducedprice lunch, compared with a statewide population that was 14 percent
minority and 26 percent FARM eligible.”53 Plaintiffs also cited research
that indicated “low-income students were twice as likely to achieve at
high levels if they attended suburban schools” to substantiate their claim
that segregation in Minneapolis schools was inhibiting their ability to
obtain an adequate education.54 A settlement between the parties, however, preempted the Minnesota courts from reaching the merits of the
claim.55
The Minneapolis litigation was followed by similar litigation that
made it to New York’s highest court in 2003. In Paynter v. State,56 the
plaintiffs argued that the high-poverty concentration in Rochester City
School District led to widespread academic failure in contrast to the
surrounding districts, and that this failure demonstrated students were
receiving inadequate educational opportunities.57 This time, unlike
Sheff and NAACP, the state’s highest court issued a decision directly addressing whether the harms of concentrated poverty deprive students
of an adequate education.58 New York’s highest court found that “allegations of academic failure alone, without allegations that the State . . .
[does not] provide minimally acceptable educational services, are insufficient to state a cause of action under the Education Article [of New
York’s Constitution].”59 The court’s opinion, however, should not be
read in isolation because, on the same day that it rejected the claims in
Paynter, the court upheld a school finance claim on behalf of New York
City’s predominantly poor and minority students in Campaign for Fiscal
Equity, Inc. v. State.60
The claims in Campaign for Fiscal Equity were distinct from Paynter.
The claim of inadequate education in Campaign for Fiscal Equity was
primarily premised on insufficient financial support from the state,
which allowed the plaintiffs to meet the court’s required showings of
both inadequate inputs and outputs, and the interconnection between
53 Kahlenberg, supra note 23, at 175; see NAACP Complaint, supra note 12, at 2, 9–15.
54 Adams, supra note 9, at 1644; see NAACP Complaint, supra note 12, at 2, 9–15.
55 Kahlenberg, supra note 23, at 176; Settlement Agreement Between Named Plaintiffs in NAACP v. Minnesota and Xiong et al. v. Minnesota and the State of Minnesota, May 16,
2000 (on file with author). Yet, the settlement did give Minneapolis students the opportunity to attend the suburban schools. Kahlenberg, supra note 23, at 176.
56 Paynter, 797 N.E.2d at 1227.
57 Id.
58 Id. at 1229.
59 Id.
60 801 N.E.2d 326, 340 (N.Y. 2003).
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the two.61 New York’s highest court has tended to conceptualize inputs
as tangible resources such as buildings, books, teachers, and services.62
Finance claims fall squarely within this approach. The claim in Paynter
was premised on the concentration of poverty created by school district
boundaries and the inadequate education that accompanies it, not on a
traditional input deprivation.63 Consequently, the court interpreted
their claims as implicating demographic patterns that are disconnected
from state policy or resources.64 Even if the plaintiffs established inadequate education in Rochester, they did not connect the inadequacy to a
resource deprivation attributable to the state.65 The most favorable
reading of the case is that the court’s rejection of the claim in Paynter
speaks more to the precise nature and limits of the constitutional right
to education in New York rather than a conceptual rejection of the
plaintiffs’ claim.66 The less favorable reading is that the court was implicitly rejecting the conceptual underpinnings of the claim, but simply
used the factual distinctions from Campaign for Fiscal Equity to reach the
desired result.67
The lessons to take from these three cases are not entirely clear.
Sheff is the only case to generate positive judicial precedent. Some conclude that the holding is not easily transferrable to other states because
the court’s theory was tied to an idiosyncratic constitutional clause.68
Yet, others have minimized the importance of any idiosyncrasy in Connecticut’s constitution and pointed out that other states have sufficiently
similar constitutions to justify expansion of Sheff’s theory.69 Either way,
the two subsequent attempts to replicate Sheff failed to produce a positive precedential opinion. The settlement in Minnesota was a practical
victory for the plaintiffs, but not a lasting principle. One could also distinguish easily enough the outcome in Paynter based on its factual and
precedential context, but one is still left in the position of asking a court
to recognize a claim that no other court previously has. The fact that so
few litigants have attempted to replicate these cases’ theories or distinguish their outcomes is, in part, an unfortunate testament to this reality.
61 Id. at 332 n.3.
62 Id. at 331–32.
63 Paynter, 797 N.E.2d at 1227.
64 Id.
65 Id. at 1229.
66 See id. at 1229–31.
67 See id.
68 See infra notes 88–91 and accompanying text.
69 See Ryan, supra note 9, at 252.
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B. Scholarly Theories
Scholars and policy advocates have been far more apt than courts
to explore socioeconomic integration theories. On the policy side,
Richard Kahlenberg has been the most visible proponent, arguing that
the increases in academic achievement that coincided with racial integration were primarily a result of the socioeconomic integration that
accompanied racial integration, and that socioeconomic integration is
more legally defensible than racial integration.70 Thus, socioeconomic
integration might be both educationally and legally preferable. Others
have made similar or related arguments.71 For some, however, the allure may be the potential to indirectly pursue voluntary racial desegregation without being subject to equal protection strict scrutiny, with the
key word being voluntary.72 At least in some instances, these theories
are not about a right to racial or socioeconomic integration, but about
defending voluntary desegregation.73 In short, the existence of poverty
isolation does not implicate a legal wrong.
Another body of scholarship, in contrast, situates the problem of
poverty concentration within the context of state constitutional rights
to an adequate or quality education. Shortly after the decision in Sheff,
James Ryan argued that advocates should pursue a fourth wave of
school finance litigation.74
[I]nstead of arguing for equalized or adequate resources,
school “finance” plaintiffs should consider arguing for socioeconomic or racial integration, or both. Relying on the social
70 See, e.g., Richard D. Kahlenberg, The Century Found., Rescuing Brown v.
Board of Education: Profiles of Twelve School Districts Pursuing Socioeconomic
School Integration 3–5 (2007); Richard D. Kahlenberg, Socioeconomic School Integration,
85 N.C. L. Rev. 1545, 1546–47 (2007).
71 See, e.g., Eboni S. Nelson, The Availability and Viability of Socioeconomic Integration PostParents Involved, 59 S.C. L. Rev. 841, 849 (2008); Kimberly Jenkins Robinson, The Constitutional Future of Race-Neutral Efforts to Achieve Diversity and Avoid Racial Isolation in Elementary
and Secondary Schools, 50 B.C. L. Rev. 277, 283–84 (2009); Jacob E. Meusch, Note, Equal
Education Opportunity and the Pursuit of “Just Schools”: The Des Moines Independent Community
School District Rethinks Diversity and the Meaning of “Minority Student,” 95 Iowa L. Rev. 1341,
1365 (2010).
72 See, e.g., Robert A. Garda, Jr., The White Interest in School Integration, 63 Fla. L. Rev.
599, 645–49 (2011); Nelson, supra note 71, at 843–44.
73 See, e.g., Robinson, supra note 71, at 283 (“[G]overnments should be given wide latitude to adopt race-neutral efforts to avoid racial isolation and create diverse schools
. . . .”); Kristi L. Bowman, A New Strategy for Pursuing Racial and Ethnic Equality in Public
Schools, 1 Duke F. for L. & Soc. Change 47, 66–68 (2009) (discussing the possibility of
using socio-economic status to continue voluntary desegregation efforts).
74 Ryan, supra note 9, at 307–10.
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science evidence that demonstrates the short- and long-term
benefits of socioeconomic and racial integration, plaintiffs
should be able to formulate an argument that racial and socioeconomic integration are necessary components of a student’s
constitutional right to an equal or adequate education.75
Ryan further emphasized that this move might be necessary if students
are to actually receive equal and adequate educational opportunities
because additional resources alone in high-poverty, racially isolated districts are likely to be insufficient.76 Five years later, Molly McUsic, reflecting on the fiftieth anniversary of Brown v. Board of Education,77
staked out a similar theory, arguing that school finance should serve as
a continuation of Brown’s legacy.78 Like Ryan, she indicated that socioeconomic integration or the alleviation of concentrated poverty is necessary and, thus, a part of the affirmative right to education under state
constitutions.79 Since then other scholars have seconded Ryan and
McUsic’s point and, in some instances, delved deeper into the details
and implications of such a claim.80 As indicated above, however, this
scholarly fervor has not yet been vindicated.
C. The Legal and Practical Distinctions of Intra-District Poverty Segregation
Although relevant, the previous theories and attempts to use state
constitutional law to address segregation are conceptually distinct from
this Article’s theory. In particular, the litigation efforts and scholarship
are largely, if not exclusively, premised on securing inter-district desegregation,81 whereas this Article proceeds on the narrower basis of intradistrict poverty desegregation. Because more segregation exists be75 Id. at 308.
76 Id.
77 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
78 McUsic, supra note 9, at 1335.
79 Id.
80 Liu, supra note 11, at 101–06 (calling for a synthesis of school finance litigation and
desegregation); Orfield, supra note 24, at 330–33; Adams, supra note 9, at 1639–42; Angela
Ciolfi, Note, Shuffling the Deck: Redistricting to Promote a Quality Education in Virginia, 89 Va.
L. Rev. 773, 799–822 (2003); Julie Zwibelman, Note, Broadening the Scope of School Finance
and Resource Comparability Litigation, 36 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 527, 529–30 (2001) (arguing that school finance litigation should broaden its scope and including desegregation as
a point of focus); see also Aaron Jay Saiger, School Choice and States’ Duty to Support “Public”
Schools, 48 B.C. L. Rev. 909, 969 (2007) (arguing that state educational clauses include the
right of parents to choose to send their children to public schools other than those in their
neighborhood).
81 See, e.g., Gooch, supra note 16, at 396–98; Orfield, supra note 24, at 273–76; Saiger,
supra note 15, at 516–27.
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tween school districts than within them,82 inter-district desegregation is
both a preferable and necessary component to addressing the needs of
many students attending high-poverty schools. But inter-district desegregation carries with it any number of practical and legal challenges
that are minimized or nonexistent with intra-district claims.83
On the practical side, intra-district desegregation, by definition,
entails a smaller and more compact geographic area. Thus, a district
has a far less tenable basis for arguing that desegregation is infeasible
or impracticable.84 In addition, school district boundaries, although
arbitrary on some level, are often long-standing, and the demographic
populations of the districts are largely a result of demographic shifts
that occurred independently and long after districting.85 Neither the
boundaries, nor the demographics shifts within them, are necessarily
related to any recent state education policy.86 Thus, as a matter of perception, district lines bear the imprimatur of tradition and neutrality.
In contrast, student assignment policies and boundaries within
districts are constantly in flux.87 As a result, a legal remedy that affects
intra-district policies would seem far less radical or disruptive than an
inter-district remedy. Likewise, because intra-district boundaries are
subject to perpetual change and debate, the active role the school system plays in deciding where students attend school is far more obvious,
whereas the demographic differences between school districts can appear to be a function of private choices rather than current public policy. This is not to suggest that the state lacks responsibility for its decisions to maintain historical school district boundaries, but only that the
perception of state and local policy is different.
This Article’s theory is, likewise, doctrinally distinct from others.
First, neither the positive decision in Sheff, nor the negative one in
Paynter, is directly applicable to this Article’s theory of intra-district
poverty segregation. Sheff is not controlling nor clearly analogous in so
82 Reardon & Yun, supra note 28, at 1573–74.
83 The history of racial desegregation has plainly demonstrated a reluctance on the
part of the courts to order interdistrict desegregation. See, e.g., Milliken, 418 U.S. at 752–53
(limiting desegregation to school district boundaries).
84 For instance, the Court in Milliken v. Bradley focused on the complexity of school finances and local responsibility issues that would arise if students were crossing boundaries,
as well as transportation burdens. Id. at 741–43.
85 See Saiger, supra note 15, at 499–501.
86 See id. But see Evans v. Buchanan, 393 F. Supp. 428, 438–40 (D. Del. 1975) (finding
that the state had recently reorganized its school districts in a way that increased segregation).
87 See Saiger, supra note 15, at 536–38.
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far as the claim there is tied to a unique constitutional clause.88 Its constitution provides, “No person shall be denied the equal protection of
the law nor be subjected to segregation or discrimination . . . because of . . .
race [or] . . . ancestry . . . ,”89 which the court interpreted to prohibit
both intentional and unintentional school segregation.90 This rationale
is potentially applicable to at least two other state constitutions, but may
not be to others.91
Second, constitutional idiosyncrasies aside, the focus on intradistrict segregation simply implicates a different legal analysis and structure. Foremost, this Article does not conceptualize the constitutional
problem as segregation per se, but as inequitable resource distribution.
Where a district is predominantly poor, a constitutional violation would
not arise from the fact that all of its schools are predominantly poor. In
effect, the district would only be constitutionally charged with fairly utilizing the resources it has, and middle-income students are not one of
them. But in districts that have a significant percentage of middleincome students, the system has an existing resource that it chooses how
to allocate each year. These districts would be constitutionally responsible for equitably allocating these resources, which means avoiding the
overconcentration of poor or middle-income students in particular
schools. Thus, this Article does not tackle the problem of demographic
shifts within states, between districts, or even the increase in poverty levels in a district as a whole. It takes poverty or wealth at the district level
as a given and potentially beyond the district’s control. But this Article’s
theory draws a constitutional distinction in regard to those middleincome and poor students enrolled in a district because these students
88 John C. Brittain, Why Sheff v. O’Neill Is a Landmark Decision, 30 Conn. L. Rev. 211,
217–18 (1997); Rachel F. Moran, Milo’s Miracle, 29 Conn. L. Rev. 1079, 1096 (1997); Alicia
L. Mioli, Note, Sheff v. O’Neill: The Consequence of Educational Table-Scraps for Poor Urban
Minority Schools, 27 Fordham Urb. L.J. 1903, 1909 (2000) (“Integrationists have hailed
Sheff as a landmark decision because of its unique qualities. . . . Sheff is the only school segregation case in force today that is based on state law, rather than federal law. Second, Sheff
mandated an interdistrict remedy that is now nearly impossible in federal desegregation
cases.”).
89 Conn. Const. art. I, § 20 (amended 1974, 1984) (emphasis added).
90 Sheff, 678 A.2d at 1282–83.
91 New Jersey and Hawaii’s constitutions also contain segregation prohibitions. Haw.
Const. art. I, § 9 (amended 1978) (guaranteeing that no citizen shall be “segregated [in
the military] because of race, religious principles, or ancestry”); N.J. Const. art. I, ¶ 5
(“No person shall be denied the enjoyment of any civil or military right, nor be discriminated against in the exercise of any civil or military right, nor be segregated in the militia
or in the public schools, because of religious principles, race, color, ancestry or national
origin.”); see also Bernard K. Freamon, The Origins of the Anti-Segregation Clause in the New
Jersey Constitution, 35 Rutgers L.J. 1267, 1311–24 (2004).
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are within the district’s control. Their existence or nonexistence cannot
be blamed on the state or third parties. Recognizing that they are a crucial resource in the delivery of adequate or equal educational opportunities, the district would be constitutionally bound to refrain from policies that offer these resources to one group of students but not others.92
Of course, this rational could extend upward to a state’s districting
policies, but the clarity of the inequity and the concept of resource distribution are less obvious when one moves beyond the district. The
point of challenging intra-district poverty segregation is to show that it
is not inevitable and, thus, it is universally problematic. Moreover, challenging this segregation does not require a grand theory of a state’s
responsibility or even poverty concentration as a per se violation of
constitutional norms. It only requires acknowledging that districts must
treat students within their borders equally in regard to constitutional or
affirmative rights—a concept so basic and accepted that, after the
Court announced Brown v. Board of Education, it has often warranted no
judicial analysis at all.
II. A Constitutional Right to Equal Access to
Middle-Income Peers
A constitutional right to equal access to middle-income peers follows from three relatively simple and largely uncontested principles in
school finance law. First, students have a right to educational opportunities that lead to positive outcomes.93 Funding, albeit important, is
relevant only because of its indirect effects on this right. Second, local
school districts’ responsibility for delivering educational opportunities
is not obviated or diminished by a state’s ultimate responsibility for
funding, monitoring, or structuring education.94 Third, like a state’s
responsibility to equitably or adequately fund and support education at
the district level, districts have a responsibility to equitably or adequately distribute the resources they receive from the state.95 Within
this framework, one need only recognize that middle-income peers are
one of a district’s resources to establish a constitutional right to equitable access to middle-income peers.

92 See infra notes 96–173 and accompanying text.
93 See infra notes 96–127 and accompanying text.
94 See infra notes 100–127 and accompanying text.
95 See infra notes 128–173 and accompanying text.
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A. The Right to Equitable and Quality Educational Opportunities,
Not Just Money
The remedy sought in state constitutional education litigation has
almost uniformly been additional funding for local school districts.96
But additional funding is not an end in and of itself. Funding is relevant only because it can purchase the critical inputs, such as teachers
and curricula, which are necessary to offer students an equal educational opportunity or some qualitative level of education.97 The ultimate issue is whether students are receiving the appropriate constitutional education,98 which can be jeopardized through any number of
state and local school policies, only one of which is financing.99 For instance, the state can just as easily deprive students of a quality education
by adopting an out-dated curriculum that focuses on the skills needed
for an agrarian society as it can by inadequately funding a modern curriculum. Thus, the constitutional right to an education places not only
financial obligations on the state, but various other duties that are necessary to ensure students receive equal educational opportunities or a
quality education.
B. Educational Responsibility Extends to the Local Level
Although most states bear the ultimate responsibility for educational failures,100 local school districts are also responsible for supporting and delivering a constitutional education. States delegate extensive
responsibilities to school districts, including financial, staffing, and implementation decisions.101 States are responsible for setting up an educational structure and monitoring local activities, but the daily and
practical aspects of delivering a constitutional education rest within the
purview and discretion of school districts.102 The misguided exercise of
96 See Note, Unfulfilled Promises: School Finance Remedies and State Courts, 104 Harv. L.
Rev. 1072, 1074–75 (1991).
97 See Ryan, supra note 9, at 308 (arguing that the right to an adequate or equal education encompasses far more than just money); James E. Ryan, Essay, Sheff, Segregation, and
School Finance Litigation, 74 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 529, 532 (1999).
98 See, e.g., Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. State, 655 N.E.2d 661, 666 (N.Y. 1995);
Hoke Cnty. v. State, 599 S.E.2d 365, 373 (N.C. 2004).
99 See Ryan, supra note 9, at 253–54.
100 See Michael A. Rebell, Poverty, “Meaningful” Educational Opportunity, and the Necessary
Role of the Courts, 85 N.C. L. Rev. 1467, 1527 (2007) (noting plaintiff victories against the
state in over half of the states).
101 See Aaron Jay Saiger, The Last Wave: The Rise of the Contingent School District, 84 N.C. L.
Rev. 857, 864–67 (2006) (discussing the extensive delegation of duties to school districts).
102 See id.
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school district discretion can just as easily lead to inadequate education
as state funding shortfalls and misguided state policy.
School finance litigation, at the broadest level, has been a battle
between states and school districts over educational responsibilities.103
Traditionally, education was treated as almost solely the responsibility of
local districts, and it was against this backdrop that most school finance
litigation was brought.104 School districts and students have attempted
to shift this paradigm, uniformly arguing that, although the practical
responsibility for delivering education rests with the district, the constitutional and ultimate responsibility for education rests with the state.105
States have responded by either rejecting the argument outright or asserting that the state has the authority to delegate extensive responsibility to districts.106 In effect, even if the state is constitutionally responsible, it has discretion in how it discharges this responsibility, including
promoting local control of education.107 Regardless, the relevant point
is that the litigation has been unilateral, focusing almost exclusively on
the extent to which state constitutions place limits and obligations on
the state. Courts have devoted only passing attention to any residual or
inherent school district responsibility, either assuming that districts are
carrying out their responsibilities appropriately or ignoring the issue
altogether.108
This unilateral focus, however, is a result of practical, not legal, realities. School finance litigation has primarily been brought by institutional stakeholders, rather than students or states.109 The reasons are
relatively obvious. School districts and teachers have more access to the
103 See Molly McUsic, The Use of Education Clauses in School Finance Reform Litigation, 28
Harv. J. on Legis. 307, 328 (1991).
104 Richard Briffault, The Role of Local Control in School Finance Reform, 24 Conn. L. Rev.
773, 781 (1992); see McUsic, supra note 103, at 332; see also, e.g., San Antonio Indep. Sch.
Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 49–50 (1973).
105 See Gregory C. Malhoit & Derek W. Black, The Power of Small Schools: Achieving Equal
Educational Opportunity Through Academic Success and Democratic Citizenship, 82 Neb. L. Rev.
50, 52 (2003).
106 See, e.g., Idaho Schs. for Equal Educ. Opportunity v. State, 976 P.2d 913, 914–15
(Idaho 1998) (attempting to assert a third-party complaint against local school officials for
failing to properly allocate funds).
107 See Hancock v. Comm’r of Educ., 822 N.E.2d 1134, 1152 (Mass. 2005) (Marshall,
C.J., concurring) (“[T]he education clause leaves the details of education policymaking to
the Governor and the Legislature.”); Hoke Cnty., 599 S.E.2d at 390–91 (finding that although the state was constitutionally responsible, it still retained discretion as to how to
rectify violations and structure education).
108 See infra note 129 and accompanying text.
109 See James E. Ryan, The Influence of Race in School Finance Reform, 98 Mich. L. Rev.
432, 451–55 (1999) (noting the number of districts suing states in various cases).
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necessary resources to initiate litigation than students, and their suits
are naturally going to be against the state. Students theoretically have
reason to sue both school districts and states, but student plaintiffs have
come from under-resourced districts and have tended to perceive that
the primary need is more resources from their state.110 In effect, their
claims are on behalf of their districts. Finally, the states have no motivation to sue anyone (other than the federal government), as they have
the legislative capacity to produce any educational arrangement they
see fit within their jurisdictions.111 Given these practical realities, the
absence of explicit judicial focus on the constitutional duties of districts
is not evidence that the duties do not exist.
More importantly, constitutional duties necessarily reside with
school districts, regardless of the courts’ holdings in regard to states.
First, where the state has primary or ultimate constitutional responsibility for education, it still carries out that responsibility through districts
and delegates certain responsibilities to them. Court holdings placing
the ultimate responsibility on states recognize that states have some responsibility and cannot simply shift all responsibility onto districts,112
but they generally refrain from endorsing the broader principle that
districts have no responsibility at all.113 Second, even if districts have no
independent constitutional responsibility, districts exercise delegated
state responsibility.114 In this respect, the distinction between state and
110 See Robert H. Tiller, Litigating Educational Adequacy in North Carolina: A Personal Account of Leandro v. State, 488 S.E.2d 255 (N.C. 1997), 83 Neb. L. Rev. 893, 899 (2005) (discussing school finance litigation by individual students against the state and the fact that
the court did not limit the evidence to the plaintiffs, but rather allowed evidence regarding the entire district).
111 Once drawn into the litigation, states do, however, have the motivation to assert
counterclaims against local districts. See, e.g., Idaho Schs., 976 P.2d at 922 (rejecting State’s
attempt to file third party complaint against district superintendants).
112See Opinion of the Justices (Reformed Public School Financing System), 765 A.2d
673, 676 (N.H. 2000) (“The State may not shift any of this constitutional responsibility to
local communities.”); see also Rebell, supra note 100, at 1485–86.
113 See, e.g., Hoke Cnty., 599 S.E.2d at 388–90; Tenn. Small Sch. Sys. v. McWherter
(McWherter II ), 894 S.W.2d 734, 738–39 (Tenn. 1995) (recognizing that the state could impose some responsibility on districts); see also Nat’l Ctr. for Educ. Statistics, U.S. Dep’t
of Educ., An Historical Overview of Revenues and Expenditures for Public Elementary and Secondary Education, by State: Fiscal Years 1990–2002, at 65–66 tbl.3.e
(2007), available at http://nces.ed.gov/pubs2007/2007317.pdf (presenting data that reveals
districts in almost every state retain responsibility for a significant portion of educational
funding).
114 See Tex. Const. art. VII, § 3 (granting the legislature power to delegate taxing authority to school districts); Campbell Cnty. Sch. Dist. v. State, 907 P.2d 1238, 1272 (Wyo.
1995) (indicating that the state has the power to delegate authority to districts so long as
the constitutional mandates of education are met).
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local responsibility is one of form, not function. Regardless of who is
primarily responsible, an obligation to provide education operates at
both the state and district levels. If a state has a responsibility to raise
funds for schools and deliver them to school districts, school districts
are responsible for expending those funds toward the benefit of public
education. A school district’s failure to do so might implicate the state,
but it would implicate the district as well.
Third, with the exception of separation of powers concerns, those
school finance claims against the state that have been rejected have
been premised on the constitutionality of educational systems where
localism dominates,115 not the notion that no educational responsibility
exists at all. Courts have held that the state has discharged its constitutional duty by creating, funding, and extending discretion to local districts.116 The courts sanction this method of carrying out the state’s
constitutional duty even though it produces significant variances
among districts,117 but this rational does not extend a blank check to
the districts. Unless one assumes that transferring constitutional duties
to local districts grants districts authority without any corresponding
responsibility or that the transfer extinguishes the rights that would
otherwise flow from the constitutional duty, students presumably have
educational rights that can be asserted against districts.
Absent such assumptions, the primary question would not be
whether local districts incur constitutional responsibility, but rather
what limits constrain districts in the exercise of delegated constitutional
authority. Of course, those limits proscribed by state statute would control, as districts cannot exercise authority that is not granted to them.118
But absent relevant statutory limits, a district would presumably have
some discretion, just as the state would have had discretion if it had retained primary control over education.119 This discretion, however, is
115 See, e.g., Comm. for Educ. Rights v. Edgar, 672 N.E.2d 1178, 1196 (Ill. 1996); Scott v.
Commonwealth, 443 S.E.2d 138, 142 (Va. 1994).
116 See Edgar, 672 N.E.2d at 1178.
117 See, e.g., Olsen v. State, 554 P.2d 139, 148 (Or. 1976) (finding that a finance system did
not violate the equal protection or education clauses of the Oregon Constitution because the
it sets a minimal standard, whereby the state is in compliance “if the state requires and provides for a minimum of educational opportunities . . . and permits the districts to exercise
local control over what they desire, and can furnish, over the minimum”); Scott, 443 S.E.2d at
142–43.
118 See, e.g., Campbell Cnty., 907 P.2d at 1272 (“It must also be accepted, however, that
the framers did not prohibit a local role but left the nature and scope of that local role to
the discretion of the legislature.”).
119 See, e.g., Neeley v. West Orange-Cove Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist., 176 S.W.3d 746, 776,
778 (Tex. 2005) (acknowledging that article VII, section 1 of the Texas Constitution
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not open-ended. Textually inherent limits would still exist on both the
state’s and local districts’ exercise of discretion. For instance, even the
most lenient of educational clauses impose a duty on the state to deliver education.120 Thus, like the state, a local district exercising delegated power would be constitutionally bound to build and maintain
schools and offer relevant instruction within them.
Fourth, other constitutional clauses would operate to constrain local districts in ways that they would not constrain the state. For instance,
courts have held that equal protection imposes few limits on legislatures
in states where the relevant education clause grants the legislature extensive freedom to delegate authority or promote localism.121 The discretion embodied in the education clause supersedes state equal protection limits. The same reasoning, however, would not logically extend to
districts. Because districts lack explicit or primary constitutional authority in regard to education,122 there is no independent authority that
would supersede the limits equal protection would otherwise place on
inequalities. Even where a state delegates power or extends discretion to
districts, this delegation would not include the authority to treat schools
or students arbitrarily or unequally within districts.123 States made analogous attempts during racial desegregation and the U.S. Supreme Court

“commits to the Legislature, the most democratic branch of the government, the authority
to determine the broad range of policy issues in providing for public education,” but reiterating that “[t]his duty is not committed unconditionally to the legislature’s discretion,
but instead is accompanied by standards”).
120 See, e.g., Edgar, 672 N.E.2d at 1190 (recognizing that the constitution imposes an
educational duty on the state, but finding that it is not for the courts to define the qualitative contours of that duty); Scott, 443 S.E.2d at 142 (rejecting plaintiffs’ claim against the
state, but acknowledging that the Virginia “Constitution does mandate that the General
Assembly provide for a system of free public schools throughout the Commonwealth, and
the General Assembly has provided for such a system”).
121 See Edgar, 672 N.E.2d at 1193–96; McDaniel v. Thomas, 285 S.E.2d 156, 168 (Ga.
1981).
122 See, e.g., Campbell Cnty., 907 P.2d at 1272 (indicating that the constitution does not
create a local role in education, but rather leaves that question to the legislature). Colorado is an exception to this general rule. Its constitution vests explicit independent educational authority in local districts. E.g., Colo. Const. art. IX, § 15. Other constitutions also
require districts to raise funds, although this is not the equivalent of educational authority
that supersedes that of the state. E.g., Wis. Const. art. X, § 4.
123 See, e.g., McDuffy v. Sec’y of the Exec. Office of Educ., 615 N.E.2d 516, 548 (Mass.
1993) (“While it is clearly within the power of the Commonwealth to delegate some of the
implementation of the duty to local governments, such power does not include a right to
abdicate the obligation imposed on magistrates [the executive branch] and Legislatures
placed on them by the Constitution.”).
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struck them down as clearly unconstitutional.124 In short, although a
state can delegate its powers to districts, it cannot authorize them to violate the state or federal constitution.125 Because districts lack primary
constitutional responsibility over education, they also lack the full discretion that responsibility affords and the equal protection leniency it
might afford in some states.
Finally, although not expansive or particularly substantive, some
constitutions place explicit constitutional responsibility on school districts. For instance, some state constitutions set minimum and/or maximum tax rates that local districts may impose for education.126 District
discretion in these states is clearly constrained within these benchmarks. Similarly, in implementing their constitutional duties, almost all
state legislatures have enacted complex statutory frameworks that obligate school districts in various educational aspects, from textbook and
curriculum selection to educational quality, teacher hiring, and district
management.127 In short, in addition to the forgoing implicit responsibilities, local districts also have explicit educational responsibilities that
rest solely with them.
C. The Resource Distribution Principle
The manner in which state and local school districts allocate their
resources is as important as the amount of resources they have.128 States
and school districts with abundant funds and resources can still fail to
124 See Griffin v. Cnty. Sch. Bd. of Prince Edward Cnty., 377 U.S. 218, 225 (1964) (striking down the state’s delegated authority to districts to close public schools and fund private tuition instead).
125 The Supreme Court has enforced the same principle at the federal level, holding
that Congress lacks the power to authorize states or localities to violate the U.S. Constitution. See, e.g., South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 210–11 (1987) (holding that Congress
cannot induce states to violate the Constitution); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 641
(1969) (“Congress may not authorize the States to violate the Equal Protection Clause.”).
126 See Ark. Const. art. XIV, § 3, amended by Ark. Const. amend. 74 (setting a base mill
rate of twenty-five for school districts); Me. Const. art. VIII, pt. 1, § 1 (mandating local districts make provisions for schools); see also Bd. of Educ. of City Sch. Dist. of Cincinnati v. Walter, 390 N.E.2d 813, 825 (Ohio 1979) (noting that the State had, pursuant to the constitution, imposed a funding floor at 20 mills); McLennan v. Aldredge, 159 S.E.2d 682, 685–86
(Ga. 1968) (discussing 1945 amendments to the constitution that set minimum and maximum mill rates).
127 See, e.g., N.C. Gen. Stat. § 115C (2009); Va. Code Ann. § 22.1-253.13:1 (West 2006);
see also Martha I. Morgan et al., Establishing Education Program Inadequacy: The Alabama Example, 28 U. Mich. J.L. Reform 559, 568–71 (1995) (discussing Alabama’s legislative and administrative structure for education).
128 See, e.g., Hoke Cnty., 599 S.E.2d at 388–89 (discussing the State’s and local districts’
responsibility to strategically allocate resources).
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provide equal or adequate opportunities if those funds are spent on the
wrong services or distributed to the wrong places.129 Likewise, a district
might have just enough resources but still fail to deliver a constitutional
education because it does not make the best strategic choices of how to
use those resources. In effect, the state may have done its part to make
a constitutional education possible, but the district can take action that
inhibits the delivery of the appropriate education. Even though the
state might have the ultimate responsibility to correct such a district,
the constitutional failure occurs at the district level and the solution is
not more funding for the district, but better allocation of existing resources. Of course, it is also possible that failures occur at both the state
and district levels. The state might provide inadequate funds and a district might make matters worse by poorly allocating those resources. In
short, constitutional rights to education require that educational systems adhere to effective distributional mechanisms and principles.130
This distributional requirement at the state level is relatively obvious in school finance litigation. For instance, equity litigation is inherently premised on the notion that the state must structure its finance
system in a way that affords all school districts equal access to resources.131 To the extent that inequitable distribution affects educational opportunity, it is facially problematic in states where education is
a fundamental right or students have a right to equal educational opportunity.132 When courts uphold equity claims, the state is forced to
allocate larger sums of money to poor school districts and less to others133 or, in the case of Texas, to recapture funds from wealthy districts
and give them to poorer districts.134
Strategic distribution of resources is not necessarily required in
adequacy claims because states are theoretically free to waste all the
money they see fit and permit vast inequality, so long as no one’s education falls below the qualitative benchmark.135 But as a practical matter,
129 See Abbott v. Burke, 575 A.2d 359, 377–82 (N.J. 1990) (discussing the variance in
how efficiently districts use their funds and the problem it creates in determining whether
money matters); William E. Thro, Judicial Analysis During the Third Wave of School Finance
Litigation: The Massachusetts Decision as a Model, 35 B.C. L. Rev. 597, 615 (1994).
130 See infra notes 131–173 and accompanying text.
131 See Julie K. Underwood, School Finance Adequacy as Vertical Equity, 28 U. Mich. J.L.
Reform 493, 497–98 (1995).
132 See id. at 504–13 (discussing the scrutiny applied to inequities when education is a
fundamental or protected right).
133 See, e.g., Serrano v. Priest, 226 Cal. Rptr. 584, 601 (Ct. App. 1986).
134 Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Meno, 893 S.W.2d 450, 486 (Tex. 1995).
135 See William S. Koski & Rob Reich, When “Adequate” Isn’t: The Retreat from Equity in
Educational Law and Policy and Why It Matters, 56 Emory L.J. 545, 562–63 (2006).
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states under adequacy mandates must also adhere to strategic distribution. Although many students may need very little additional support to
obtain an adequate education, others have special needs or face barriers that require the educational system to respond with supplemental
monetary, curricular, or service supports.136 Because states lack the lavish resources to both waste resources on some students and fund the
special needs of others, states are forced to redistribute larger per-pupil
expenditures or supplemental funds to poorer districts and districts
with large proportions of at-risk students.137 The failure to do so would
present not only a problem of adequacy, but equity, as the system is effectively providing one set of students an adequate education while denying it to others.138
Although less obvious, the constitutional dimensions of distributional decisions are no less applicable at the school district level. Where
courts have enforced a distributional principle against the state, there is
no reason why the state would be permitted to accomplish indirectly
through districts what it cannot accomplish directly itself.139 Likewise,
even were the state not implicated by local actions, a school district
should not be free to create inequalities that the state could not. To
permit as much would make the quality and quantity of the state’s allocation irrelevant and completely contingent on district whims. This
would invert the constitutional structure and make districts superior to
the state.
The same rationale might also apply in states where courts have
rejected equity claims against the state.140 Courts in those states may
136 Rebell, supra note 100, at 1480.
137 See Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. State (Fiscal Equity III ), 801 N.E.2d 326, 348–
49 (N.Y. 2003); DeRolph v. State, 728 N.E.2d 993, 1014–15 (Ohio 2000).
138 See Derek Black, Unlocking the Power of State Constitutions with Equal Protection: The First
Step Toward Education as a Federally Protected Right, 51 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1343, 1406
(2010) (arguing that federal equal protection is implicated when states are providing one
set of students an adequate education but are denying it to others); see also Koski & Reich,
supra note 135, at 562–65.
139 The U.S. Supreme Court has made this point clear in regard to the relationship between Congress and the states, holding that Congress is prohibited from using its spending
power to encourage others to engage in unconstitutional actions. See, e.g., Dole, 483 U.S. at
210–11 (holding that Congress cannot induce states to violate the Constitution). The
Court has, likewise, recognized exceptions to the state actor doctrine and prohibited discrimination by private actors when their activity was intertwined with government or replicated government functions. See Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 724–
25 (1961).
140 See Martin R. West. & Paul E. Peterson, The Adequacy Lawsuit: A Critical Appraisal, in
School Money Trials: The Legal Pursuit of Educational Adequacy 1, 4–7 (Martin
R. West & Paul E. Peterson eds., 2007) (listing the states where equity claims have failed).
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relieve the state of equitable resource distribution, but it does not follow that they also relieve local districts. The state’s legitimate end of
fostering local control, which is the justification for allowing inequalities,141 is far different from a single school district treating schools and
students within it unequally. First, autonomy and inequality at the
school level is not necessary for local control. Sufficient local control
would presumably exist as a result of the state delegating educational
power to the districts. States have never argued, nor have any other parties suggested, that local control necessitates school level control. Second, a delegation of authority to districts contemplates variance between districts, not schools. Thus, inequalities that are a consequence
of delegation to districts fall squarely within a constitutional scheme,
whereas school level inequalities would not.
These local distributional and allocation decisions are so central to
state education rights that some courts have explicitly emphasized
school districts’ distributional responsibility. North Carolina offers a
leading example. In 1999, in Leandro v. State, the North Carolina Supreme Court held that students have a right to a sound basic education,142 and defined the right as including qualitative knowledge in various academic subjects sufficient to prepare students to participate and
compete in society and work.143 The court then remanded the case for a
determination of whether students were receiving this education.144 In a
second opinion, the court evaluated whether students were receiving a
sound basic education by focusing on three distinct aspects of the education system: outputs, inputs, and delivery mechanisms. Outputs included, but were not limited to, standardized test scores, graduation
rates, college attainment, and remediation needs.145 Inputs included
teachers, curricular programs, and funding.146 Delivery mechanisms
referred to how the state and school districts allocate and dispense the
resources they have.147 In effect, the court evaluated whether the educational system is effectively using its resources to provide students with a
sound basic education.148
141 See, e.g., Kukor v. Grover, 436 N.W.2d 568, 585 (Wis. 1989) (holding that disparities
in funding of local school districts do not violate the right to a public education because
the principle of local control that produces the disparities is constitutionally based).
142 488 S.E.2d 249, 254 (N.C. 1997).
143 Id.
144 Id. at 261.
145 Hoke Cnty., 599 S.E.2d at 381.
146 Id. at 389.
147 Id. at 388–89.
148 Id.
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The court ultimately found that the state was providing insufficient
resources for students to receive a sound basic education, but the court
also agreed with the trial court “‘that neither the State nor . . . [the
Hoke County School System] are strategically allocating the available
resources to see that at-risk children have the equal opportunity to obtain a sound basic education.’”149 Consequently, the court directed
both the state and school districts to “conduct self-examinations of the
present allocation of resources and to produce a rational . . ., comprehensive plan which strategically focuses available resources and funds
towards meeting the needs of all children, including at-risk children[,]
to obtain a sound basic education.”150 This directive potentially implicates every local and state policy bearing upon the quality of education,
whether it is the more obvious funding priorities of a district or the
more subtle decisions regarding the way in which a district assigns its
teachers to schools or determines which students will have access to
schools that provide particular resources and opportunities.
Other courts have been less prescriptive than North Carolina, but
similarly emphasize the importance of local distributional and allocation decisions. For instance, the Tennessee Supreme Court upheld the
plaintiffs’ school finance claim against the state, but acknowledged that
significant responsibility still fell on the districts.151 The court indicated
that the state could impose “funding and management responsibilities
upon counties, municipalities, and school districts, within their respective constitutional powers” and, in such cases, those districts would be
prohibited from mismanagement, indifference, or incompetence that
undermined “the constitutional mandate of substantial equality of opportunity.”152
Another category of states implicitly includes the duty to strategically utilize resources within the very definition of the right to education. Although the distributional and allocation points are not as clearly
stated as in North Carolina, these states define the right to education in
such a way that it would border on implausible to exclude distributional
and allocation principles from the right.153 In particular, some educa-

149 Id. at 388 (alteration in original) (quoting the trial court).
150 Id. at 389 (alteration in original) (quoting the trial court).
151 Tenn. Small Sch. Sys. v. McWherter (McWherter I ), 851 S.W.2d 139, 140–41 (Tenn.
1993).
152 Id. at 141.
153 See infra notes 158–173 and accompanying text.
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tion clauses mandate an “efficient” education.154 In total, twenty-two
states fall into this category.155 The dictionary definition of “efficient”
offers straightforward meanings, which include “performing or functioning in the best possible manner with the least waste of time and effort” and “satisfactory and economical to use.”156 Courts have interpreted their constitutional language consistent with such definitions.157
Two of the leading cases on point come from West Virginia and
Kentucky. In 1979, in Pauley v. Kelly, the West Virginia Supreme Court
found that the constitutional phrase “efficient” commanded that “the
education system be absolutely complete, attentive to every detail, extending beyond ordinary parameters. . . . [I]t must produce results
without waste.”158 In addition, the court indicated the constitutional
language required that a quality education be delivered “economically.”159 Although the lawsuit was against the state, the court’s reasoning also encompassed local school districts’ actions.160 The court noted
that many other courts “have required specific actions by local boards
to bring them to compliance with the constitutional mandate” and that
state action that failed to ensure local compliance had likewise “been
declared unconstitutional.”161 In setting the standard for West Virginia,
the court concluded that, in addition to quality instruction and facilities, the constitutional mandate requires “careful state and local supervision to prevent waste and to monitor pupil, teacher and administrative competency.”162 In short, the court’s definition of efficiency
includes not just the duty to fund and support schools, but to ensure
they run well and to maximize the impact of the resources they have,
which, of course, would entail strategic allocation and distribution at
the state and local levels.
The Kentucky Supreme Court, in 1989, defined its constitutional
mandate of efficiency similarly in Rose v. Council for Better Education.163
The Court ultimately held and broadly stated:
154 See Ky. Const. § 183 (“The General Assembly shall, by appropriate legislation, provide an efficient system of common schools throughout the state.”).
155 See William E. Thro, Commentary, The Role of Language of the State Education Clauses
in School Finance Litigation, 79 Educ. L. Rep. 19, 23–24 (1993).
156 Efficient Definition, Dictionary.com, http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/effi
cient (last visited Jan. 10, 2012).
157 See infra notes 158–173 and accompanying text.
158 255 S.E.2d 859, 874 (W. Va. 1979).
159 Id. at 877.
160 Id. at 874.
161 Id.
162 Id. at 877.
163 790 S.W.2d 186, 210 (Ky. 1989).
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The General Assembly must not only establish the [qualitatively adequate educational] system, but it must monitor it on
a continuing basis so that it will always be maintained in a
constitutional manner. The General Assembly must carefully
supervise it, so that there is no waste, no duplication, no mismanagement, at any level.164
The prohibition on waste and duplication necessarily demands strategic resource allocation, and the extension of this prohibition to all levels of education necessarily includes school districts.165
It is important to note that, although the foregoing cases and the
basic language of efficiency might dictate local distributional responsibilities, the precise wording of a state’s education clause has not always
been determinative of its substantive meaning.166 In adequacy cases in
particular, courts, notwithstanding the fact they were addressing various
different constitutional phrases, have reached essentially the same conclusion regarding the substantive effect of their educational clauses.167
These courts have concluded that the constitution’s intent is to offer a
quality education that prepares students for later educational, civic, and
employment opportunities and duties,168 regardless of whether the underlying constitutional language guarantees a thorough, minimal, adequate, uniform, or efficient education.169 Yet, the willingness of courts
164 Id. at 211.
165 In reaching this conclusion, the court considered “foreign cases, along with our
constitutional debates, Kentucky precedents and the opinion of experts.” Id. at 210. It
seemed to rely heavily on two expert witnesses. Id. One expert opined that an efficient
education is “a three part concept. First, the system should impose no financial hardship
or advantage on any group of citizens. Further, local school districts must make comparable tax efforts. Second, resources provided by the system must be adequate and uniform
throughout the state. Third, the system must not waste resources.” Id. The other expert
also opined that an efficient system of schools is one that is “properly managed.” Id. at 211.
166 William E. Thro, Note, To Render Them Safe: The Analysis of State Constitutional Provisions in Public School Finance Reform Litigation, 75 Va. L. Rev. 1639, 1659–60 (1989).
167 Compare Rose, 790 S.W.2d at 212 (holding that the constitutional mandate to “provide an efficient system of common schools throughout the state” guarantees students an
adequate education), with Leandro, 488 S.E.2d at 254 (holding that the constitutional language of “a right to the privilege of education” and “the duty of the State to guard and
maintain that right” guarantees students a sound basic education), and Fiscal Equity III, 801
N.E.2d at 328 (holding that the constitutional mandate to “provide for the maintenance
and support of a system of free common schools, wherein all the children of this state may
be educated” guarantees students a sound basic education).
168 See supra notes 112–127 and accompanying text.
169 See Paul L. Tractenberg, Education, in 3 State Constitutions for the TwentyFirst Century: The Agenda of State Constitutional Reform 241, 293 n.137 (G. Alan
Tarr & Robert F. Williams eds., 2006) (“[D]isembodied parsing of constitutional terminology may be of limited or no value.”).
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to underplay the exact language in their constitution has generally coincided with expanding rather than limiting education rights. It is,
thus, far less clear that a court would disregard a constitutional directive that benefits students.
More importantly, the mandate of efficient education is, in key
respects, less ambiguous than other educational mandates. As to substantive and qualitative meanings of constitutional phrases, all constitutional iterations of education stand in relatively the same position because the quality and content that is necessary to prepare students for
work, citizenship, and daily life is a moving targe contingent on context. Thus, in regard to substantive qualitative guarantees, “efficient”
may be no more definite than high quality, adequate, or thorough.170
But as to administrative and structural components—what one might
call procedural or non-substantive aspects of education— efficient has a
definiteness that is missing in other phraseologies. In fact, the phraseologies often ignore this side of education altogether. As the dictionary
definitions above suggest, the core consensus meanings of efficient
speak to these procedural aspects. Moreover, this distinction helps synthesize the judicial opinions in those states interpreting their mandates
of efficiency. Those states that have refused to follow West Virginia and
Kentucky’s lead appear to have done so not because efficiency is ambiguous in regard to procedural aspects of education, but because it is
ambiguous as to substance.171 Once one narrows the definitional inquiry of educational efficiency, its mandate of strategic resource utilization would seem largely beyond dispute.
In sum, states and local districts have a constitutional duty to distribute resources so as to eliminate inequities and inadequacies in educational opportunity. This concept is logically inherent in equity claims,
as their central premise is an illegitimate allocation of resources
amongst districts. In adequacy claims, the concept is a practical necessity because available educational resources are limited and must be
focused in a way that prevents the most disadvantaged schools and students from falling below qualitative thresholds. And regardless of
whether plaintiffs have proceeded under equity or adequacy claims, the
concept is embedded in the very language of constitutions that man-

170 Edgar, 672 N.E.2d at 1184–85 (arguing that the term efficient is not unambiguous
and defining it differently than other jurisdictions); Hornbeck v. Somerset Cnty. Bd. of
Educ., 458 A.2d 758, 770 (Md. 1983) (indicating that the word efficient is susceptible to
more than one meaning). But see Rose, 790 S.W.2d at 212.
171 See Edgar, 672 N.E.2d at 1184–85; Hornbeck, 458 A.2d at 770.
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date an “efficient” education.172 Both court opinions and straightforward dictionary definitions indicate as much.173
D. The Final Link
The foregoing principles would potentially implicate a host of educational policies beyond financing.174 For the purposes of this Article,
the most important application is in regard to local student assignment
policies, particularly those that result in racially unequal access to middle-income peers. But as noted earlier, the recognition of a constitutional right to equal access to middle-income peers requires one additional conceptual step that, although alluded to by one court, no court
has yet made.175 That step is to establish the connection between an
adequate or equal educational opportunity and racially equitable access
to middle-income peers. This connection can be conceptualized
through four interrelated, yet distinct, factual predicates. First, assigning high proportions of poor students to particular schools creates resource and other barriers that impede the ability of students in those
schools to obtain a quality education and deny them equal opportunity.
Second, middle-income students or environments are themselves resources or inputs, just like money, which are essential to obtaining quality educational opportunities. Thus, under an equity or adequacy theory, the state must consciously and fairly manage these crucial
resources. Third, the cost of delivering adequate or equal educational
opportunities in schools with concentrated poverty far exceeds the cost
of delivering adequate or equal opportunities in middle-income
schools. In times of economic crisis, local school districts and states are
highly unlikely to have sufficient resources to fund constitutionally
adequate opportunities in high-poverty schools. And in times of both
prosperity and crisis, high-poverty schooling is economically inefficient.
Finally, although courts have yet to make any of the three conceptual connections between constitutional educational opportunities and
the distribution of middle-income peers, several courts have paid specific attention to the prevailing circumstances of poor academic achievement in districts with high concentrations of poor and at-risk students,
treating those circumstances as prima facie evidence of inadequate edu172 See Edgar, 672 N.E.2d at 1184–85; Hornbeck, 458 A.2d at 770.
173 It also bears noting that some of these inequalities might be equally prohibited under federal law, depending on their causes. See Black, supra note 138, at 1350–51.
174 See Ryan, supra note 9, at 296–307.
175 See supra notes 22–27 and accompanying text.
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cation and recognizing the existence of constitutional violations in these
districts.176 A search for the root cause of these violations would inevitably lead to the foregoing conceptualizations of access to middle-income
peers. The following Sections discuss each of these points in full.
1. Harms of Racial and Poverty Isolation
The educational harms that minority students suffer as a result of
attending school in racial isolation are well documented. AfricanAmerican students’ achievement on the National Assessment of Educational Progress lags twenty-seven scaled points behind whites in reading
and thirty-one points in math.177 This achievement gap is equivalent to
two to three years of learning.178 Thus, African-American eighth graders are earning scores equivalent to sixth-grade white students. Research indicates that much of this achievement gap is not based on race
itself, but is largely attributable to the fact that predominantly minority
schools are also overwhelmingly high-poverty schools,179 and highpoverty schools depress the academic achievement of students who attend those schools.180 It is not just that a student’s individual demographic characteristics make him or her less likely to succeed; rather,
high-poverty schools have a negative impact on a student’s educational
outcomes regardless of the student’s individual socioeconomic status.181
In at least six major academic categories, predominantly poor and
minority schools cause harm or deliver inferior educational opportunities to students. First, students in predominantly poor and minority

2.

176 See infra notes 238–255 and accompanying text.
177 The Condition of Education, supra note 8, App. A, at 153 tbl.A-12-2, 157 tbl.A-13-

178 Christopher Lubienski & Sarah Theule Lubienski, Nat’l Ctr. for the Study of
Privatization in Educ., Charter, Private, Public Schools and Academic Achievement: New Evidence from NAEP Mathematics Data 5 (2006), available at http://www.
ncspe.org/publications_files/OP111.pdf (explaining how to interpret achievement gaps on
the NAEP); The Condition of Education, supra note 8, App. A, at 153 tbl.A-12-2, 157 tbl.A13-2.
179 See Anurima Bhargava et al., NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc. & The Civil Rights Project, Still Looking to the Future: Voluntary K–12 School Integration 14 (2008); Derek W. Black, In Defense of Voluntary Desegregation: All Things Are Not
Equal, 44 Wake Forest L. Rev. 107, 117–18 (2009); Ryan, supra note 9, at 272–75.
180 See Coleman et al., supra note 25, at 21–22; Kahlenberg, supra note 23, at 47; Socioeconomic Composition of the Public Schools, supra note 26, at 1–4; McUsic, supra
note 9, at 1355–56.
181 See Coleman et al., supra note 25, at 302–10; Kahlenberg, supra note 23, at 62;
Socioeconomic Composition of the Public Schools, supra note 26, at 1–4; Borman &
Dowling, supra note 26, at 1201–02; McUsic, supra note 9, at 1355–56; Perry & McConney,
supra note 26, at 1137–38.
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schools tend to receive a generally low-quality curriculum and have unequal access to high-level curricular offerings.182 Second, even though
research shows teacher quality is closely linked to student achievement,183 students in predominantly poor and minority schools tend to
have limited access to highly qualified teachers.184 As a general matter,
these schools find it extremely difficult to attract high-quality teachers.
Even when they do secure quality teachers, predominantly poor and
minority schools find it difficult to retain them.185 The best teachers
often leave high-poverty, high-minority schools as soon as they obtain
sufficient experience.186 Predominantly poor and minority schools are
then forced to replace the departing teachers with inexperienced and
less qualified teachers.187 Consequently, predominantly poor and minority schools suffer from exceptionally high teacher turnover.188 The
182 See Ruth B. Ekstrom et al., Education and American Youth 57–60 (1988);
Jeannie Oakes et al., Curriculum Differentiation: Opportunities, Outcomes, and Meanings, in
Handbook of Research on Curriculum 570, 570–608 (Philip W. Jackson ed., 1992).
183 See generally Linda Darling-Hammond, Teacher Quality and Student Achievement: A Review of State Policy Evidence, 8 Educ. Pol’y Analysis Archives, no. 1, 2000 at 1, available at
http://epaa.asu.edu/ojs/article/viewFile/392/515 (finding teacher quality to be strongly
related to student achievement based on fifty state survey and National Assessment of Educational Progress).
184 See Stephen Carroll et al., Rand Corp., The Distribution of Teachers Among
California’s School Districts and Schools, at xx–xxii (2000); Susanna Loeb & Michelle Reininger, The Educ. Policy Ctr. at Mich. State Univ., Public Policy and
Teacher Labor Markets: What We Know and Why It Matters, at i–iv (2004); Daniel P.
Mayer et al., U.S. Dep’t of Educ., Monitoring School Quality: An Indicators Report
10–14 (2000), available at http://nces.ed.gov/pubs2001/2001030.pdf; Charles T. Clotfelter et
al., Who Teaches Whom? Race and the Distribution of Novice Teachers, 24 Econ. Educ. Rev. 377,
391 (2005); Catherine E. Freeman et al., Racial Segregation in Georgia Public Schools, 1994–2001,
in School Resegregation: Must The South Turn Back? 148, 157–59 ( John Charles Roger & Gary Orfield eds., 2005); Christopher Jencks & Meredith Phillips, The Black-White Test
Score Gap: Why It Persists and What Can Be Done, Brookings Rev., Spring 1998, at 24, 26
(1998), available at http://www.brookings.edu/articles/1998/spring_education_jencks.aspx
(“Predominantly white schools seem to attract more skilled teachers than black schools.”);
Steven G. Rivkin et al., Teachers, Schools, and Academic Achievement, 73 Econometrica 417, 450
(2005); Jay Mathews, Top Teachers Rare in Poor Schools, Wash. Post, Sept. 10, 2002, at A5 (discussing the dearth of high quality teachers in low income schools).
185 See Eric A. Hanushek et al., Why Public Schools Lose Teachers, 39 J. Hum. Resources
326, 337 (2004).
186 See id.; see also Barnett Berry & Eric Hirsch, Ctr. for Teaching Quality, Recruiting and Retaining Teachers for Hard-to-Staff Schools 2 (2005) (identifying
recruiting and retention problems in high-poverty, low-performing schools); Susan
Moore Johnson et al., Harvard Grad. Sch. of Educ., Who Stays in Teaching and
Why: A Review of the Literature on Teacher Retention 9–10 (2005).
187 See Hanushek, supra note 185, at 347–52.
188 See Erica Frankenberg, The Civil Rights Project at Harvard Univ., Segregation of American Teachers 25–31 (2006), available at http://campaignforethnicstudies.
pbworks.com/f/segregation_american_teachers12-06.pdf (revealing that teacher dissatisfac-
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lack of continuity in their teaching staff itself, likewise, negatively impacts schools.189
Money alone cannot easily fix the problem of teacher staffing at
predominantly poor and minority schools because the problem is not
simply one of money.190 Rather, the racial and socioeconomic characteristics of schools significantly influence where teachers decide to
teach.191 Those teachers with options---who tend to be high-quality
teachers---generally will not voluntarily choose to teach in highminority, high-poverty schools.192 Of course, money is not entirely irrelevant, but absent huge salary increases, teachers will still prefer
schools with fewer numbers of poor and minority students.193 And, in
any event, very few predominantly poor and minority school systems
have the resources to offer such huge salary increases. In fact, it is not
unusual for predominantly poor and minority school districts to have
less money to attract teachers than surrounding school districts.194 In
short, predominantly poor and minority schools are seriously disadvantion tends to rise as the percentage of minority students in a school rises, making it more
likely that teachers will leave); Educ. Trust, Their Fair Share, How Texas-Sized Gaps
in Teacher Quality Shortchange Low-Income and Minority Students 6 (2008),
available at http://www.edtrust.org/sites/edtrust.org/files/publications/files/TXTheirFair
Share.pdf (illustrating teacher turnover is consistently higher in the highest-poverty and
highest-minority Texas school districts); Socioeconomic Composition of the Public
Schools, supra note 26, at 4–6.
189 See Frankenberg, supra note 188, at 42–44.
190 See Jane L. David, Teacher Recruitment Incentives, Educ. Leadership, Apr. 2008, at 84,
85–86.
191 See Susanna Loeb et al., How Teaching Conditions Predict Teacher Turnover in California
Schools, 80 Peabody J. Education 44, 65 (2005); Wendy Parker, Desegregating Teachers, 86
Wash. U. L. Rev. 1, 35–37 (2008). See generally Benjamin Scafidi et al., Race, Poverty, and
Teacher Mobility (Ga. State Univ. Sch. of Policy Studies Research Paper Series, Working Paper 06-51, 2005), available at http://aysps.gsu.edu/publications/2006/downloads/Scafidi
Sjoquist_RacePovertyTeacherMobility.pdf (finding that teachers are more likely to leave
high-poverty schools that also have a high proportion of minorities).
192 See Alliance for Excellent Educ., Improving the Distribution of Teachers
in Low-Performing High Schools 7 (2008), available at http://www.all4ed.org/files/
TeachDist_PolicyBrief.pdf (indicating that several states already have incentive pay for lowperforming schools, but pay increase alone is insufficient to attract teachers); Hanushek,
supra note 185, at 350–51 (finding that a ten percent salary increase would be necessary
for each increase of ten percent in minority student enrollment to induce white females to
teach in the school).
193 See Alliance for Excellent Educ., supra note 192, at 7; Hanushek, supra note
185, at 350–51.
194 See, e.g., Educ. Trust-West, California’s Hidden Teacher Spending Gap: How
State and District Budgeting Practices Shortchange Poor and Minority Students and Their Schools 1 (2005), available at http://www.edtrust.org/west/publication
/californias-hidden-teacher-spending-gap-how-state-and-district-budgeting-practices-0.

2012]

Middle-Income Peers and the Constitutional Right to Equal Access

407

taged in securing one of the most important resources: highly qualified
teachers.195
Third, unequal access to teachers and curriculum has the natural
result of negatively impacting student achievement. Students in predominantly poor and minority schools routinely achieve much lower
than students in predominantly white schools.196 For instance, a study
of Charlotte-Mecklenburg schools in North Carolina showed that, even
controlling for factors such as a student’s family background, prior
achievement, peer effects, and self-reported academic effort, students
who spent more time in predominantly minority elementary schools
had lower standardized test scores and grade point averages in middle
and high school.197 Likewise, Wake County, North Carolina’s study of
its own schools revealed similar achievement failures in those schools
with the highest levels of poor students,198 which also strongly correlates with race in Wake County. These examples are the norm. As one
judge noted, more than eighty percent of the lowest performing school
districts in North Carolina are predominantly minority.199
Fourth, the depressed achievement of students in predominantly
poor and minority schools has compounding long-term effects as well.
The graduation rates in these schools are alarmingly low. On average,
only four out of ten students graduate on time in the nation’s predominantly poor and minority high schools.200 For instance, in 2004–2005 in
Baltimore City Schools, a high-poverty and high-minority school system,
only one-third of the students graduated on time.201 Moreover, lower
graduation rates hold true regardless of a student’s individual race or
wealth.202 These low graduation rates are partly attributable to students
195 See Darling-Hammond, supra note 183, at 31–33 (finding that teacher quality and
student achievement are closely linked).
196 See, e.g., Russell W. Rumberger & Gregory J. Palardy, Does Resegregation Matter?: The
Impact of Social Composition on Academic Achievement in Southern High Schools, in School Resegregation: Must the South Turn Back?, supra note 184, at 127, 137–39.
197 Roslyn Arlin Mickelson, Segregation and the SAT, 67 Ohio St. L.J. 157, 157 (2006);
Roslyn Arlin Mickelson, Subverting Swann: First- and Second-Generation Segregation in the Charlotte-Mecklenburg Schools, 38 Am. Educ. Res. J. 215, 220 (2001).
198 Wake Cnty. Pub. Sch. Sys., E&R Report No. 01.21, The Effect of School Poverty Concentration in WCPSS 4 fig.1 (2001), available at http://www.wcpss.net/eval
uation-research/reports/2001/0123_Poverty.pdf.
199 Letter from Howard E. Manning, Jr., N.C. Superior Court Judge, to June St. Clair
Atkinson, State Superintendent, and Howard N. Lee, Chairman State Bd. of Educ. (Mar. 3,
2006) (on file with author).
200 Bhargava, supra note 179, at 19.
201 Id. at 19 tbl.3.
202See Christopher B. Swanson, Urban Inst. Educ. Policy Ctr., Who Graduates
in the South? 2 (2005); Christopher B. Swanson, Urban Inst. Educ. Policy Ctr.,
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in predominantly poor and minority schools having lower success on
graduation exams,203 but many students in these schools drop out before they even take the graduation exam. Simply attending a predominantly poor and minority school makes a student significantly more likely to drop out of high school.204
Fifth, attending a predominantly poor and minority school tends to
limit students’ access to later opportunities in higher education and
employment. Students from predominantly minority schools are less
likely to matriculate to college and four-year universities.205 Likewise,
those who do not pursue higher education also have less access to social
networks that are crucial to securing jobs.206 As a general matter, racially
integrated middle-income schools have the inverse effect of predominantly poor and minority schools on graduation and matriculation
rates.207 In sum, high-poverty, predominantly minority schools expose
students of all races and socioeconomic classes to serious educational
harms that make it far more likely than not that they will receive a constitutionally deficient education. Where these high-poverty schools result from student assignment policies within the district, rather than the

Who Graduates? Who Doesn’t? A Statistical Portrait of Public High School
Graduation, Class of 2001, at 31–34 (2004).
203 Chungmei Lee, The Civil Rights Project at Harvard Univ., Racial Segregation and Educational Outcomes in Metropolitan Boston 6–9 (2004) (noting that in
metropolitan Boston, only sixty-one percent of tenth-grade students in high-poverty, highminority schools passed the English/Language Arts graduation test in the 2002–2003
school year compared to ninety-six percent of students attending low-minority, low-poverty
schools); Kathryn M. Borman et al., Accountability in a Post-Desegregation Era: The Continuing
Significance of Racial Segregation in Florida’s Schools, 41 Am. Educ. Res. J., 605, 612 (2004)
(examining achievement differences on Florida’s graduation exam).
204 See Robert Balfanz & Nettle E. Legters, Locating the Dropout Crisis: Which High Schools
Produce the Nation’s Dropouts?, in Dropouts in America: Confronting the Graduation
Rate Crisis 57, 62–63 (Gary Orfield ed., 2004).
205 Joseph B. Berger et al., The Civil Rights Project at Harvard Univ., Race
and the Metropolitan Origins of Postsecondary Access to Four Year Colleges:
The Case of Greater Boston 19–21 (2004), available at http://www.eric.ed.gov/PDFS
/ED489181.pdf; Robert Teranishi et al., Opportunity at the Crossroads: Racial Inequality, School
Segregation, and Higher Education in California, 106 Tchrs. C. Rec. 2224, 2243–44 (2004).
206 See Derek Black, The Case for the New Compelling Government Interest: Improving Educational Outcomes, 80 N.C. L. Rev. 923, 953 (2002) (“Attending racially diverse schools opens
up social networks to racial minorities, which often lead to additional job opportunities. As
these benefits increase, they will perpetuate themselves naturally, and further integrate the
job market and social networks.”).
207 See Bhargava, supra note 179, at 17–20; Eric M. Camburn, College Completion Among
Students from High Schools Located in Large Metropolitan Areas, 98 Am. J. Education 551, 557–
60 (1990).
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overall poverty of the district itself, the constitutional allocation principles discussed in the previous Section are directly implicated.208
2. Middle-Income Students as a Resource
Although high-poverty schools can undermine students’ education, predominantly middle-income schools bring affirmative benefits
to the learning environment. The crucial ingredient in the success of
middle-income schools is the students who attend them. Middleincome students themselves are thus an educational resource. The
quality of a student’s educational experience can be as dependent on
his peers as it is on his teachers, the quality of his school building, or
the substance of his curriculum. First, students depend heavily upon
one another for their learning.209 They study together, teach one another, and compete against one another, raising the academic bar.210
Due to the opportunities they receive outside of school, middle- and
high-income students tend to bring more educational capital to school
and, thus, elevate the learning of those around them.211 Second, middle-income students come from families that tend to have higher academic expectations for their children.212 When these students are the
majority in a school, the students create a culture of high achievement
that benefits everyone.213 Third, middle-income students’ parents tend
to place high expectations on school officials and hold them accountable.214 As a result, these schools are more effective than others.215
Fourth, as the previous Section suggests, those resources that are important to learning—high-quality teachers, leadership, curriculum, fi-

208 See supra notes 128–173 and accompanying text.
209 See Kahlenberg, supra note 23, at 48–58.
210 See id. See generally Douglas N. Harris, How Do School Peers Influence Student Educational
Outcomes? Theory and Evidence from Economics and Other Social Sciences, 112 Tchrs. C. Rec.
1163 (2010) (developing a theory of group-based contagion whereby the dominant group
sets the tone and expectations for others).
211 See Kahlenberg, supra note 23, at 48–58.
212 See id.; Osamudia R. James, Business as Usual: The Roberts Court’s Continued Neglect of
Adequacy and Equity Concerns in American Education, 59 S.C. L. Rev. 793, 807 (2008); see also
Rita E. Mahard & Robert L. Crain, Research on Minority Achievement in Desegregated Schools, in
The Consequences of School Desegregation 103, 122–23 (Christine H. Rossell & Willis
D. Hawley eds., 1983).
213 See Kahlenberg, supra note 23, at 48–58.
214 Id.; Mahard & Crain, supra note 212, at 122–23.
215 See Kahlenberg, supra note 23, at 48–58; McUsic, supra note 9, at 1355–56.
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nancing, and facilities—all tend to exist when the majority of a school’s
students are middle income.216
In sum, although not a resource in the traditional sense of an input that a school can buy, the intangible benefits that middle-income
students bring to the learning environment make them a vital resource.
In fact, as the experience of socioeconomically isolated schools demonstrates, middle-income students are a resource that schools cannot easily afford to go without. The data and social science on this point is
relatively clear.217 Middle-income parents instinctively recognize this
and jockey to enroll their children in solidly middle-income schools or,
at least, middle-income classes if they cannot secure a middle class
school.218 Thus, the conceptual hurdle is not recognizing the importance of middle-income peers, but recognizing that they are an educational resource, just as are teachers, facilities, and books. The primary
difference is that school systems cannot generate middle incomestudents, but they nonetheless make decisions through their student
assignment policies regarding those middle-income students they do
have. Once student assignments are understood as resource allocations,
they should be subject to the same distributional, management, and
equity principles that state constitutions require for money and other
resources.
3. The Expense and Inefficiency of Racial and Socioeconomic Isolation
Delivering education in schools with concentrated poverty is economically inefficient. It is, of course, possible for poor and minority
students to obtain a quality education in high-poverty schools. In fact, a
small but high-profile contingent of predominantly poor and minority
216 See James E. Ryan, Five Miles Away, A World Apart: One City, Two Schools,
and the Story of Educational Opportunity in Modern America 15, 169, 171, 173
(2010).
217 See Michael J. Puma et al., U.S. Dep’t of Educ., Prospects: Final Report on
Student Outcomes 12 (1997) (“School poverty depresses the scores of all students in
schools where at least half of the students are eligible for subsidized lunch, and seriously
depresses the scores when over 75 percent of students live in low-income households.”).
218 See Jennifer Jellison Holme, Buying Homes, Buying Schools: School Choice and the Social
Construction of School Quality, 72 Harv. Educ. Rev. 177, 201–03 (2002); Jeannie Oakes, Can
Tracking Research Inform Practice? Technical, Normative, and Political Considerations, Educ. Researcher, May 1992, at 12, 14 (indicating middle-income parents lobby to get their children into high ability group classes). See generally Elizabeth L. Useem, Middle Schools and
Math Groups: Parents’ Involvement in Children’s Placement, 65 Soc. Education 263 (1992)
(finding that parents with college degrees are more likely to have their children placed in
upper-level mathematics courses than those without degrees).
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schools defy the odds and achieve at high levels.219 But delivering a
quality education to students under these circumstances can cost far
more per pupil than it otherwise would.220 First, because poor students
are already at-risk of academic failure and that risk is further increased
by attending a high-poverty school, these schools need the best, not the
worst teachers.221 Yet as discussed earlier, teachers are predisposed
against teaching in these schools and, thus, it costs significantly more to
lure high-quality teachers to high-minority, high-poverty schools.222 Second, for various practical reasons, high-poverty schools cost more to
keep safe than other schools.223 Third, the need for intensive instructional and social service programs tends to be significantly higher in
high-poverty schools.224
Federal legislation and studies explicitly recognize this reality. The
federal government estimates that the cost of educating low-income
students is approximately forty percent more than middle-income stu219 The most widely publicized today are the Harlem Children’s Zone charter schools
and KIPP charter schools. See generally Patricia J. Kannapel & Stephen K. Clements,
Prichard Comm. for Academic Excellence, Inside the Black Box of High-Performing
High-Poverty Schools (2005) (recounting one state’s attempt to identify the common
elements of successful high-poverty schools). These schools largely seem to be operating in a
similar fashion to middle-income schools. Id. at 28–29. There are, however, so few of these
high-performing, low-income schools because replicating their environment elsewhere has
been elusive.
220 See Adams, supra note 9, at 1627–31; Ryan, supra note 9, at 256–58; (questioning
whether money alone can deliver adequacy in concentrated poverty); Heather Schwartz,
Housing Policy Is School Policy: Economically Integrative Housing Promotes Academic Success in
Montgomery County, Marland, in The Future of School Integration: Socioeconomic
Diversity as an Education Reform Strategy 27, 52–53 (Richard D. Kahlenberg ed.,
2012) (discussing empirical findings that integration reforms were more academically and
cost effective than programmatic interventions in high-poverty schools); see also Marco
Basile, The Cost Effectiveness of Socioeconomic Integration, in The Future of School Integration, supra, at 127, 150. In North Carolina in particular, research strongly suggests that
more resources and more effective use of existing resources will be needed to offset the
effects of schools with higher levels of segregation among minority students. See generally
Charles L. Thompson et al., Carolina Inst. for Pub. Policy, North Carolina High
School Resource Allocation Study (2008) (discussing chronically low-performing
high schools, which also tend to be predominantly minority schools).
221 Charles Clotfelter et al., High-Poverty Schools and the Distribution of Teachers and Principals 4 (Nat’l Ctr. for Analysis of Longitudinal Data in Educ. Research, Working Paper No.
1, 2007), available at http://www.caldercenter.org/PDF/1001057_High_Poverty.pdf.
222 See supra notes 177–199 and accompanying text.
223 See Michelle Parthum, Note, Using Litigation to Address Violence in Urban Public
Schools, 88 Wash. U. L. Rev. 1021, 1031–37 (2011) (discussing the various disciplinary and
safety challenges that high-poverty urban schools face).
224 See Weiner & Pristoop, supra note 6, at 6 (discussing low-income students’ need for
supplemental resources); see also Campaign for Fiscal Equity v. State (Fiscal Equity I ), 719
N.Y.S.2d 475, 490 (Sup. Ct. 2001).
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dents,225 and that the per-pupil costs rise exponentially as both the percentage and overall number of poor students in a district increases.226
Federal funding for low-income students, however, only offsets a portion of these additional costs. The fact that so many state supreme
courts have found that their education finance systems are providing
inequitable or inadequate funds to students in such districts is persuasive evidence that states are either unwilling or unable to devote the
resources necessary to offset the negative effects of the segregated education.227 Moreover, the remedies in several of these cases have recognized the higher costs in high-poverty districts and driven additional
resources to these districts.228 Of course, socioeconomically integrated
schools must also provide supplemental services for at-risk children, but
they do not bear the other, sometimes exponentially, higher costs that
are associated with high-poverty schools.229
The higher cost of educating students in concentrated poverty
presents both constitutional and practical problems. As a practical matter, the unfortunate truth is that districts and states rarely have the resources or the will to fund quality education in high-poverty school districts.230 The prospects are even worse during times of economic crisis.
Currently, schools across the board are experiencing dwindling local
revenues and huge cuts in their state funding231 While some jurisdictions may have the capacity to raise taxes or absorb the losses without
affecting educational quality, property-poor districts’ capacity to generate revenue tends to be maxed out even during times of prosperity,
225 Education Finance Incentive Grant Program § 1125(A), 20 U.S.C. § 6337 (2006)
(setting the standard for whether low-income schools are fairly funded as whether they
receive a forty percent funding increase adjustment); Nat’l Ctr. for Educ. Statistics,
U.S. Dep’t of Educ., Inequalities in Public School District Revenues 62 (1998)
(identifying forty percent as the appropriate adjustment for low-income students).
226 See 20 U.S.C. §§ 6335(c)(1)(B), (c)(2)(B), 6337 (d)(1)(A), (B) (2006).
227 See Rebell, supra note 100, at 1500–05 (summarizing the litigation results).
228 See, e.g., Abbot v. Burke, 710 A.2d 450, 457–58 (N.J. 1998).
229 Adams, supra note 9, at 1630–31.
230 See, e.g., Socioeconomic Composition of the Public Schools, supra note 26, at
6–7; see also Wiener & Pristoop, supra note 6, at 6 (detailing the funding gaps in 2006, well
before the current economic crisis arose).
231 See Nicholas Johnson et al., Ctr. on Budget & Policy Priorities, An Update
on State Budget Cuts (2011), available at http://www.cbpp.org/cms/index.cfm?fa=view
&id=1214; Erik A. Hanushek, Cry Wolf! This Budget Crunch Is for Real, Educ. Wk., May 19,
2010, at 32, 40; Lesli A. Maxwell, K–12 Cuts Loom Again as States’ Fiscal Woes Continue: With
Budget Gaps Growing, About Half Expect K–12 Cuts, Educ. Wk., Mar. 3, 2010, at 15, 18; Sam
Dillon, Gates Urges School Budget Overhauls, N.Y. Times, Nov. 19, 2010, at A21; Tamar Lewin
& Sam Dillon, With Revenue Cut, Schools Are Warning of Huge Layoffs, N.Y. Times, Apr. 21,
2010, at A12.
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and, thus, they have no excess to draw upon or cut during a crisis.232 In
fact, one study suggests that there has never been a systemic funding of
the full costs of educating students in high-poverty schools.233 Economic hardship may inevitably force them to diminish the quality of
their educational offerings below already insufficient levels.234 In short,
the practical reality has been a choice between just two options: providing poor and minority students an adequate education within an integrated environment, or offering them an inadequate education elsewhere. Unfortunately, the frequent choice is a segregated education
devoid of the resources necessary for full adequacy, yet still more expensive than integrated education.
The economic cost of educating students in high-poverty schools
when other options are available raises constitutional concerns as well.
Most obviously, courts in leading cases like Rose and Pauley specifically
prohibit waste and inefficiency,235 which are directly implicated by
shouldering higher education costs just to maintain poverty or wealth
concentrations. The same rationale would tend to follow in states with
rigorous concepts of equity, as the state could be required to justify
funding variances between districts. Of course, many state constitutions
do not entail a rigorous concept of efficiency or equity.236 Thus, if all
schools were delivering adequate or equal educational opportunities,
the cost or waste associated with doing so might be excusable. In effect,
the ends might justify the means. Yet, circumstances where school systems are so flush with resources that they can deliver adequate or equal
outcomes amidst rampant waste and inefficiency are hard to imagine
on any consistent basis. For instance, geographic and transportation
circumstances might make the cost of deconcentrating poverty higher
than simply shouldering the full cost of delivering a constitutional edu-

232 See Nat’l Research Council, Making Money Matter: Financing America’s
Schools 46–47 (Helen F. Ladd & Janet S. Hansen eds., 1999); see also McWherter I, 851
S.W.2d at 143 (stating that “[b]ecause of lack of fiscal capacity, there is little the poor
school districts can do to offset” the loss of revenue that has resulted from economic activity moving to regional centers).
233 Wiener & Pristoop, supra note 6, at 7 tbl.4.
234 Advocates are already alleging as much. See, e.g., David Harrison, New Budget Cuts
Threaten School Funding Settlements, Stateline (Dec. 6, 2010), http://www.stateline.org/live
/details/story?contentId=533003 (discussing the problems that diminished educational
funds create for complying with a past state finance settlement); Anthony Ramirez, Further
Cuts Spur Fear of Lawsuits, Las Vegas Sun, Nov. 23, 2010, at A1 (discussing the potential for
a lawsuit in Nevada as a result of education cuts).
235 Rose, 790 S.W.2d at 211; Pauley, 255 S.E.2d at 874.
236 See Thro, supra note 155, at 23–24.
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cation in concentrated poverty,237 but this would be an exception to the
rule, which a district presumably must establish, rather than the general rule itself. In sum, when students attend schools in concentrated
poverty out of administrative convenience, historical practice, or other
less defensible reasons, the financial waste involved runs counter to an
efficient use of educational resources and makes delivering a quality
and constitutional education highly unlikely.
4. High-Poverty Schooling and Failure as Prima Facie Evidence
Although no court has yet taken the conceptual step suggested
above, courts have routinely paid particular attention to high-poverty
school districts and treated the circumstances that tend to arise in them
as prima facie evidence of a constitutional violation.238 These courts
have not recognized the constitutional dimensions of the distributional
decisions that lead to high-poverty schools (as they may assume these
school conditions are natural or inevitable),239 but these courts have
been quick to recognize the negative educational outcomes in highpoverty schools as representing a constitutional violation. Thus, a relatively fine line separates courts’ evidentiary focus from the conceptual
step articulated above. Courts need only distinguish high-poverty
schooling that is inevitable from high-poverty schooling that is created.
Then the courts’ focus can move behind the seemingly obvious unconstitutional outcomes to the unconstitutional distributional decisions
that are less obvious, but lead to the outcomes.
One of the key prevailing facts in high-poverty school districts that
has drawn courts’ attention is their dropout rate. Several courts have
treated an extremely high dropout rate as prima facie evidence of inadequate or inequitable educational opportunities.240 As one state supreme court wrote:
237 For instance, the geographic distance between some communities and schools can
make the transportation costs and commuting time high enough that integrative assignment policies are inefficient.
238 See infra notes 239–255 and accompanying text.
239 See Martha R. Mahoney, What’s Left of Solidarity? Reflections on Law, Race, and Labor History, 57 Buff. L. Rev. 1515, 1586–87 (2009); Parker, supra note 1, at 1177; powell & Menendian, supra note 27, at 1095.
240 See Montoy v. State, 112 P.3d 923, 934 (Kan. 2005); see also Hancock, 822 N.E.2d at
1168 (Greaney, J., dissenting) (stating that the lower court “examined a number of objective criteria used by the department [of education] as indicators of education program
quality”); Neeley, 176 S.W.3d at 767–69, 787, 789; Fiscal Equity I, 719 N.Y.S.2d at 520 (“In
sum, City public school students’ graduation/dropout rates and performance on standardized tests demonstrate that they are not receiving a minimally adequate education.”).
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[A]n inordinate number of [the district’s] students have consistently failed to match the academic performance of their
statewide public school counterparts and . . . such failure,
measured by their performance while attending [the district’s] schools, their dropout rates, their graduation rates
[and] their need for remedial help . . . constitute[s] a clear
showing that they have failed to obtain a [constitutionally]
comporting education.241
In short, a high dropout rate represents “‘a systematic weakness . . . in
meeting the needs of . . . students.’”242 As indicated earlier, this systematic weakness is most obvious in high-poverty schools. They tend to
have alarmingly high dropout rates that exceed those of any other
schools.243 Student assignment policies that operate to starve these
schools of the most important resources of high-quality teachers and
middle-income students make widespread failure almost certain. In
short, high-poverty, high-minority schools almost always include this key
indicia of inadequate or inequitable education.
The second area of judicial focus that corresponds with the recognition of middle-income peers as a constitutionally relevant resource is
the concentration of at-risk and poor students. Courts have not treated
concentrated poverty as a factor within the state’s control, but they have
treated the existence of concentrated poor kids as tending to raise constitutional concern. North Carolina’s Supreme Court, for instance, included within its five major findings and conclusions that “there were
an inordinate number of ‘at-risk’ students attending [the district in
question]”244—a category of students defined elsewhere as including
poor and minority students.245 The court then reiterated the inordinate
number of at-risk students and academic failures in the district several
times, indicating that the concentration of failure and at-risk students is
exactly what demands the attention of the state and school districts to
ensure students have the opportunity to receive a sound basic education.246 A New York court was even more poignant, writing that, “A defining characteristic of the New York City public school system is its
241 Hoke Cnty., 599 S.E.2d at 386.
242 Id. at 384.
243 See Bhargava, supra note 179, at 21; see also N.C. Dep’t of Pub. Instruction, 2006
4-Year Cohort Graduation Rate by School (2007), http://www.ncpublicschools.org/
docs/newsroom/news/2006-07/byschool-attach4.pdf.
244 Hoke Cnty., 599 S.E.2d at 392.
245 Id. at 389 n.16.
246 See id. at 392.
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high concentration of students from poor and low income families. . . .
The intersection of factors such as students’ poverty, immigration status, and limited English language proficiency means that New York City
has a high proportion of students ‘at risk’ for academic failure.”247 The
New Jersey Supreme Court took recognition of the importance of concentrated poverty to the next level, specifically tying certain services to
the level of concentrated poverty in districts.248 Other courts have, likewise, recognized the need for particularized remedies in such districts.249
Interestingly, while New York and North Carolina’s courts were
attuned to concentrated poverty, both refused to entertain the intersection of concentrated poverty and failure as giving rise to a distinct
claim. In North Carolina, the court did not per se reject the claim “that
due to the particular demographics of . . . urban districts, which include many disadvantaged children, . . . [these districts are] entitled to
an unequally large per-pupil allocation of state school funds,”250 but the
court concluded that the claim did not warrant independent treatment
because it was “repetitious of [the] previous argument that the state
must provide all of its children with the opportunity to receive a sound
basic education.”251 In effect, if the concentration of at-risk students in
urban districts gave rise to additional needs, the state would already be
obligated to meet them and no specialized claim is necessary to reach
this conclusion. Thus, the predicate inquiry is the same in every dis247 Fiscal Equity I, 719 N.Y.S.2d at 490. The dissenting judge in the lower court properly
forecast the appellate court’s opinion, writing “children from impoverished families may
experience further hurdles if they attend a school filled with similarly disadvantaged children, schools with ‘concentrated poverty.’” Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. State (Fiscal
Equity II ), 744 N.Y.S.2d 130, 153 (App. Div. 2002) (Saxe, J., dissenting).
248 Abbott, 710 A.2d at 462–63 (explicitly tying pre-kindergarten and other services to
concentrated poverty levels).
249 See Montoy v. State, 138 P.3d 755, 758 (Kan. 2006) (“We noted that the evidence at
trial demonstrated the opposite—that the districts with high-poverty, high at-risk student
populations are the ones that need help attracting and retaining teachers.”); Lake View
Sch. Dist. No. 25 of Phillips Cnty. v. Huckabee, 189 S.W.3d 1, 4 (Ark. 2004). An adequacy
study indicated one requirement was
[a]dditional staff members for schools with high concentrations of poverty, to
include tutors and “pupil support personnel” added to school faculty for each
100 students qualifying for federal free and reduced-price lunches, with a
minimum of one at each school; in addition, each 100 children identified as
“English Language Learners” (ELL) generate an additional 0.40 full-time
equivalent (FTE) tutor/teacher.
Huckabee, 189 S.W.3d at 4.
250 Leandro, 488 S.E.2d at 257.
251 Id.
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trict: are students receiving a sound basic education? New York’s highest court implicitly reached the same conclusion by rejecting a constitutional claim arising out of Rochester’s high-poverty district on the same
day it recognized a claim of inadequate education in New York City’s
high-poverty schools.252 The difference between the two cases was that
the plaintiffs in New York City simply alleged an inadequate education,
which would presumably require more funding, while the plaintiffs in
Rochester claimed that concentrated poverty itself was a violation.253
The astute attention to the problem of high-poverty schooling, yet
fine parsing as to whether it gives rise to an independent claim, suggests that courts generally recognize a problem, but may not understand its cause or constitutional relevance. If concentrated poverty
merely coexisted with inadequate education without causing it or concentrated poverty was unavoidable in all instances, the approaches of
New York and North Carolina’s courts would be defensible. Yet neither
of these is invariably true. First, as social science reveals, academic barriers do not randomly occur in high-poverty districts; rather, the fact
that a school is high-poverty is a primary reason why high-quality teachers pursue opportunities elsewhere.254 Likewise, the barriers a student
encounters due to his own poverty will follow him to any school he attends, but the expectations and rigor placed on his classroom and
school as a whole are a result of the poverty level of his school.255 Second, as this Article’s empirical study below reveals, not all concentrated
poverty is inevitable. Rather, much concentrated poverty is the result of
policies within districts themselves. If these two crucial facts can be impressed upon courts, the distinction between the high-poverty districts
representing the conditions of unconstitutional education and highpoverty districts as a cause of unconstitutional education should diminish and open the way to constitutionalizing equal access to middleincome peers.
III. Empirical Evidence of Widespread Violations
School districts and states make resource distribution decisions
when they develop student assignment policies. In a district where all
schools are middle income, the decision to maintain some schools at
eighty percent middle income and others at sixty-five or seventy percent
252 See Paynter, 797 N.E.2d at 1228–29; Fiscal Equity III, 801 N.E.2d at 330–31.
253 See Paynter, 797 N.E.2d at 1228–29; Fiscal Equity III, 801 N.E.2d at 330–31.
254 See supra notes 184–195 and accompanying text.
255 See supra notes 205–208 and accompanying text.
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is unlikely to present a constitutional problem; nor, in an overwhelmingly poor district is it likely that a constitutional problem arises from
assigning slightly larger percentages of middle-income students to a particular school when all of the schools remain predominantly poor.256
But when a school district concentrates poor students in particular
schools when other options are available, it necessarily makes decisions
that will create barriers to learning, starves the schools with concentrated poverty of vital resources, and depresses academic achievement
therein. Similarly, when an educational system over-concentrates middle-income students in particular schools, it necessarily allocates one of
its most valuable resources away from some students and toward other
students. As the following Sections demonstrate, decisions of these sorts
consistently occur along racial lines, undermining the ability of minority
students to receive a sound basic education.257 Yet from the outset, this
Article acknowledges that it paints with a relatively broad brush in dealing with complex questions of student assignment and achievement,
and that nuanced and definitive conclusions require study by individuals
with statistical expertise far beyond that of the author of this Article.
Nonetheless, the results of this Article’s study reveal trends of inequity
that implicate district level student assignment policies and beg explanations.
A. Inquiries and Methodology
1. Equality of Access
This Article’s empirical study examines two issues: first, the extent
to which school districts are providing minority students unequal access
to middle- income peers; and second, the extent to which this inequality corresponds with larger achievement gaps. In resolving these issues,
the study does not attempt to identify an optimum percentage of middle-income students in a school. Rather, it accepts the social science
consensus that the socioeconomic demographics of a school matter.258
By doing so, the study can ask the narrower questions of what school
districts do with the middle-income students in their districts and
whether those decisions correspond with any changes in achievement
256 Of course, if these distributional choices were based on race, they would violate
equal protection. Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 209–10 (1973). Thus, this Article’s
primary purpose is to address racially unequal access that may not be or cannot be shown
to be intentional discrimination.
257 See Socioeconomic Composition of the Public Schools, supra note 26, at 9.
258 See supra notes 177–208 and accompanying text.
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gaps. In this respect, this inquiry is distinct from most other studies, as
it accepts rather than questions the level of poverty that exists within a
district. This study seeks only to resolve whether the access to the middle-income students that exists within a district is equal.
For instance, consider a district where only thirty percent of the
students are middle income. The district can assign students in such a
way that white students are more likely than minority students to attend
school with these middle-income students. White students might still be
in predominantly poor schools, but the average white student might be
in a school with forty or forty-five percent middle-income students
while the average minority student is in a school with only twenty-five
percent middle-income students. This study’s methodology, in most
instances, would not qualitatively distinguish between this disparity and
one that results in a district where all students of all races attend predominantly middle-income schools, but whites attend schools with
higher percentages of middle-income students. Rather, the primary
distinction this study’s methodology would reveal between these districts would be if one district was creating a higher or lower racial disparity in access to existing middle-income peers. In this respect, the
study remains neutral as to districts’ demographic populations, and focuses squarely on racially equal access. If access to middle-income peers
is a key educational resource, then district actions that distribute these
resources in a racially unequal manner are the key concern, and just as
problematic as funding or staffing a minority school at lower levels than
a white school down the road in the same district.
The first step in this Article’s methodology for assessing “equality
of access” to middle-income peers is to identify the percentage of middle-income students in every school in a given state, which it calculates
as the percentage of students in a school that do not qualify for free or
reduced lunch. Second, the study identifies the percentage of white,
African-American, and Latino students in each school. Third, the study
uses school level data to calculate district level average access to middleincome students for Latino, African-American, and white students.259
Next, the study compares the average access of each of these racial
groups and translates it into a percentage.260 For instance, if the average white student attends a school where fifty percent of his peers are
259 The formula for a racial group’s average access to middle-income peers is: [(number of students in racial group in school A x percentage of middle-income peers in school
A) + (same formula for every school)] / (total number of students in racial group in district).
260 The formula is: (average African-American access)/(average white access).
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middle income and the average Latino student attends a school where
only twenty-five percent of his peers are middle income, the Latino student’s access to middle-income peers would be fifty percent that of
whites. The study calculated the access of Latinos and African Americans separately and found that they tended to experience similar levels
of inequality in comparison to whites. Thus, for purposes of efficiency,
simplicity, and clarity, the study combines African Americans and Latinos into one group termed “minority” in presenting unequal access.261
Moreover, this grouping of minority students is consistent with past
practices of federal courts,262 as the relevant disadvantage is most often
between minorities and whites rather than between minority groups.
It is important to note, however, this methodology cannot account
for segregation that may be occurring at the classroom level. Minority
students could be far more socioeconomically segregated than this Article’s study suggests because not all students necessarily come into contact or equal contact with the middle-income students who are in their
schools.263 It is not unusual for a minority student to be in a middle
class school and still not have much exposure to middle-income students because the student is assigned to classrooms that have high percentages of poor students.264 Thus, it is altogether possible that some
districts that are not represented in this study as providing significantly
unequal access are nonetheless creating problematic socioeconomic
isolation in their classrooms.265 But that isolation is not evident because
such schools maintain a relatively high level of socioeconomic integration at the school level.
The danger of overlooking important classroom segregation is
highest in districts that have only one elementary, middle, or high
school. In these districts, this study’s methodology would show minority
261 The formula is: (number of African-American and Latino students in School A) x
(percentage of middle-income peers in School A) + (same formula for every school in
district)/ (total number of African-American and Latino students in District) / (number
of white students in School A) x (percentage of middle-income students in School A) +
(same formula for every school in district) / (total number of white students in district).
262 See, e.g., United States v. City of Yonkers, 833 F. Supp 214, 221 (S.D.N.Y. 1993)
(comparing Latino and African-American test results to those of whites and Asians); Comfort ex rel. Neumyer v. Lynn Sch. Comm., 283 F. Supp. 2d 328, 379–80 (D. Mass. 2003) (explaining why a desegregation plan that classified students as either white or non-white was
appropriate in the city of Lynn).
263 See Kevin G. Welner, Tracking in an Era of Standards: Low-Expectation Classes Meet HighExpectation Laws, 28 Hastings Const. L.Q. 699, 702–03 (2001).
264 Id.; see also Thomas Cnty. NAACP v. City of Thomasville Sch. Dist., 299 F. Supp. 2d
1340, 1354–55 (M.D. Ga 2004) (finding racial disparities between ability groups).
265 See Welner, supra note 263, at 703–08.
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and white students as having the exact same level of access to middleincome peers, even though they might not have equal access at the
classroom level. Almost all districts, however, have more than one elementary and middle school and, thus, the segregation at the earlier
grades is still captured by this data and partially—although not completely—prevents the single high school anomaly from entirely skewing
the data. In short, the study can achieve its primary purpose of revealing the general problem of racially unequal access to middle-income
peers, but cannot identify its exact contours and may understate inequality in some instances.
2. Racial Achievement Gap Changes in Relation to Racially Inequitable
Access
The study’s second inquiry is whether racially differential access to
middle-income peers corresponds with changes in racial achievement
gaps on standardized tests. It examines both the achievement gap between whites and African Americans and the achievement gap between
whites and Latinos. Nearly every school district in the country has a racial achievement gap, regardless of its integration level.266 Social science would indicate that a significant portion of this achievement gap
is attributable to demographic and local factors beyond the scope of
this study.267 This study does not attempt to examine the role these other factors play and, instead, only attempts to measure the extent to
which the achievement gap widens or narrows in districts where minority students have unequal access to middle-income peers. To do so, the
study ignores the variation in overall achievement between districts.
The fact that a district’s student population is high income and high
performing, or low income and low performing, should have little effect on the study’s results. By ignoring the absolute levels of achievement between districts and instead analyzing the differential achievement of students within a district, the study is able to compare the
achievement gap across districts in a way that is less subject to varying
266 See Nat’l Ctr. for Educ. Statistics, supra note 8, at 44–51.
267 See, e.g., Jaekyung Lee, Racial and Ethnic Achievement Gap Trends: Reversing the Progress
Toward Equity?, Educ. Researcher, Jan. 2002, at 3, 6 (noting that the conventional factors
affecting achievement are socioeconomic and family conditions, youth culture and student
behavior, and schooling conditions and practices); Constantinos Papanastasiou, Internal and
External Factors Affecting Achievement in Mathematics: Some Findings from TIMSS, 26 Stud. in
Educ. Evaluation 1, 4–5 (2000) (claiming that external factors affecting achievement include socioeconomic status, educational background, school climate, and language background).

422

Boston College Law Review

[Vol. 53:373

demographics and other factors across districts that affect overall absolute achievement.
For example, only sixty percent of hypothetical District A’s white
students and fifty percent of its African-American students might be
achieving at grade level, whereas ninety percent of hypothetical District
B’s white students are at grade level and seventy percent of its AfricanAmerican students. One might assume that District B is doing a better
job of educating African Americans, but District A’s smaller achievement gap suggests this may not be true in all respects. District’s B’s
higher test scores are likely attributable to higher funding, better
teachers, or the fact that so many of its students are middle income.268
Thus, although District B has higher scores, its larger achievement gap
suggests that it may not be utilizing its resources in a way that promotes
racial equity. In contrast, District B may not be a high-quality district on
any number of measures, but its smaller achievement gap suggests that
it is offering students an equal opportunity to benefit from those resources that it does have. In short, this study’s methodology treats the
fact that one district’s overall achievement is lower than another district’s due to its demographics or other factors as irrelevant, focusing
instead on whether a district’s student assignment policies correspond
with changes in the racial achievement gap.
B. Data Selection and Collection
Studying patterns of poverty isolation and racial inequality within
districts presents a few challenges. The first problem is the sheer size of
the data set. There are over 10,000 school districts, ranging in size from
around 1000 students to over 100,000.269 Some of the relevant data for
this study is not in a centralized database and requires pulling data
from differing locations.270 Thus, a national study entails extensive
268 See Puma, supra note 217, at 78–79 (analyzing the effect of concentrated poverty on
standardized test scores); Darling-Hammond, supra note 183, at 32 (“[W]hile student demographic characteristics are strongly related to student outcomes at the state level, they
are less influential in predicting achievement levels than variables assessing the quality of
the teaching force.”); Rebell, supra note 100, at 1476–79 (analyzing the effect money has
on educational outcomes).
269 Common Core of Data (CCD), Nat’l Ctr. for Educ. Statistics, http://nces.ed.gov/
ccd/ (last visited Feb. 19, 2012).
270 Most of the relevant demographic details are in a national database. Build a Table,
Nat’l Ctr. for Educ. Statistics, http://nces.ed.gov/ccd/bat/ (last visited Feb. 19, 2012).
But because the study relies on states tests, it required retrieving data from each individually
and state data varied in its usability. For instance, in North Carolina, the achievement gap
data was not available in a downloadable format but rather had to be gathered from each
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work. The second problem is the variation in district structure. School
districts in some states are organized on the county level, whereas other
states have school districts that are neighborhood or city based.271 Differing structures can have a significant and misleading effect on the
question of equal access to middle-income peers. Geographically smaller school districts are more likely to have school populations that are
both small and demographically homogenous.272 The converse is true
of larger districts.273 To the extent a school population is small and relatively homogenous, analysis of unequal access may be irrelevant. For
instance, if all the students in the district attend the same elementary
school, then by necessity they experience the same access. Likewise,
regardless of the number of schools in the district, if almost all the students in a district are of one socioeconomic class, there can be no unequal access. If districts with these characteristics were the exceptions
rather than the general rule in a state, meaningful analysis of unequal
access at the district level could still proceed. But in some states, smaller
or community-based school districts are the norm, and significant segregation tends to exist between districts rather than within them.274 Of
course, the inequalities between homogenous districts are still subject
to analysis, but that analysis is different in substance and would implicate a different legal analysis than the one forwarded by this Article. In
short, this Article’s legal analysis is based on unequal distribution of
students within districts, which is more prevalent and noticeable in
large and diverse school districts.
To ensure a data set manageable in size, this study limits its data
collection to a sample (albeit a large sample). To avoid the problem
that inter-district segregation would pose, this study intentionally collects data from states where school districts are largely organized at the
county level. Most southeastern states follow this pattern.275 But to test
district’s state report card. See Search Options, Educ. First N.C. Sch. Report Cards, http://
www.ncreportcards.org/src/ (last visited Feb. 19, 2012).
271 North Carolina’s districts are almost all county districts. Thus, the State has only
114 districts. Build a Table, supra note 270. Conversely, Pennsylvania organizes districts at
the community level and has nearly 800. Id.
272 See, e.g., John Charles Boger, Education’s “Perfect Storm”? Racial Resegregation, High
Stakes Testing, and School Resource Inequities: The Case of North Carolina, 81 N.C. L. Rev. 1375,
1424 (2003); Claudia Goldin & Lawrence F. Katz, Human Capital and Social Capital: The Rise
of Secondary Schooling in America, 1910–1940, 29 J. Interdisc. Hist. 683, 702 (1999).
273 Goldin & Katz, supra note 272, at 694.
274 Id. at 706–08.
275 See Gary Orfield, Metropolitan School Desegregation: Impacts on Metropolitan Society, 80
Minn. L. Rev. 825, 840 tbl.2 (1996). See generally Goldin & Katz, supra note 272 (using
county level data).
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the assumption that intra-district segregation would not be significant
enough to provide meaningful comparisons to achievement gap
changes in states with small districts, the study also includes states outside of the Southeast that have far more and far smaller districts. In total, this study includes six southeastern states—North Carolina, Alabama, Georgia, Mississippi, South Carolina, and Virginia—and five
northeastern and midwestern states—Connecticut, Massachusetts,
Michigan, Ohio, and Pennsylvania.276
C. Study Results
Overall, the study revealed a serious problem with racially unequal
access to middle-income peers within districts—a problem that stretches
across all states. Some districts were providing access that was so unequal
it was shocking. In four of the states, there were districts that provided
whites twice as much access to middle-income peers as minorities. This
is the difference between whites attending a solidly middle-income
school, at seventy percent middle-income peers, and minorities attending a solidly poor school, at only thirty-five percent middle-income
peers. A few districts even provided whites access that was three to five
times that of minorities. The data also revealed that in several states a
quarter of the districts were providing access that, although not shockingly unequal, was disparate enough to create qualitatively different experiences for white and minority students. And on the basic question of
rough equality, in some states, only about half the districts provided
equal access. In short, far too many school districts have student assignment policies that place minority students at educational risk in comparison to whites and, thus, raise serious constitutional concerns.

276 In a few districts, the average minority student attended schools that had a higher
percentage of middle-income students than the average white. Generally speaking, this
higher access for minorities is significant, as it often occurs when the district is almost exclusively poor and minority or predominantly wealthy and almost entirely white. In the
former, the average minority might attend a school with five percent middle-income students while the few whites in the district attend a school that is four percent middleincome students. As a practical matter, both racial groups have the same access to middleincome peers, but the study’s methodology would indicate a large statistical difference. See,
e.g., Chester, PA (Average Minority Access: 12.5%; Average White Access 10.3%; Minority
Access Compared to Whites: 121.7%); see also Sparta Area Schools, Michigan (Average
Minority Access: 60%; Average White Access: 69%; Minority Access Compared to Whites:
110%; Overall Percentage of White Students: 87%).
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1. Widespread Differential Access
Minority access to middle-income peers ranged from as low as
twenty percent compared to that of whites in one district to equal access in numerous districts. In a few districts, minorities’ average access
to middle-income peers was actually higher than that of whites. Categorizing districts offers a clearer understanding of this varying access. Table 1 divides school districts into categories based on the amount of
access to middle-income peers they offer minorities in comparison to
whites. The column labeled “Access Below 50%” would capture, for instance, a district where the average white student attends a school with
seventy percent middle-income students and the average minority student attends a school with less that thirty-five percent middle-income
students.277
Table 1: Percentage of Districts Providing Minorities Unequal Access to MiddleIncome Peers
Access Below Access Below Access Below Access Below Access Below
40%
50%
75%
95%
100%
4.0%
8.0%
18.0%
38.0%
42.0%
Alabama
1.6%
2.7%
12.8%
34.8%
67.4%
Georgia
0.0%
3.6%
15.3%
36.5%
63.5%
Mississippi
0.0%
0.0%
17.5%
68.4%
87.7%
North Carolina
0.0%
1.2%
8.5%
45.1%
69.5%
South Carolina
0.0%
0.8%
3.1%
26.0%
74.0%
Virginia
0.0%
0.0%
0.6%
13.0%
67.3%
Connecticut
0.0%
0.0%
1.5%
9.2%
51.7%
Massachusetts
0.1%
0.5%
1.2%
13.6%
48.5%
Michigan
0.04%
0.6%
33.7%
52.5%
56.1%
Ohio
0.2%
0.2%
1.6%
12.1%
56.3%
Pennsylvania
Source: See infra Apps. A, B.
State

The “Access Below 40%” and “Access Below 50%” categories represent districts providing drastically unequal access to minorities. Districts providing less than seventy-five percent access, likewise, provide
significantly different experiences to minorities and whites, just not
necessarily as stark. But as school districts approach 100% access, qualitative characterizations likely become less obvious, as some variation
among schools will necessarily exist for practical reasons. This Article
treats access at ninety-five percent or higher to be within the normal
margin of variance and, thus, equal notwithstanding the small disparity.
277 See, e.g., Hamilton, OH (Average Minority Access: 35.9%; Average White Access:
72.8%; Minority Access Compared to Whites: 49.35%).
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Nonetheless, the study identifies the “Access Below 100%” as its own
category because it does represent absolute equality. Interestingly, a
quick review of Table 1 suggests states’ scores on absolute equity bear
little relation to their scores in the lower categories that represent problematic inequality.
The data in Table 1 reveal significant variation across districts and
states. All states have significant pockets of unequal access, but the
pockets of inequality exist at different tipping points in different states.
For instance, Virginia had the second highest percentage of districts
providing less than numerically equal access in the South at seventyfour percent, but it ranked the lowest on all the other categories. In
contrast, Alabama had the most districts, by a large margin, that were
providing minorities less than half of the access of whites. Yet, Alabama
also had the most districts that were providing equal or nearly equal
access. In short, Alabama appears to have a large number of both good
and bad school districts, but fewer in between.
Differences between the regions also existed and sometimes were
greater than those within them. Most notably, the northern states have
relatively low numbers of unequal access. For instance, in two northern
states, Massachusetts and Connecticut, not a single school district provided minorities less than fifty percent access and, in the three other
northern states, less than one percent of districts provided less than
fifty percent access.278 Likewise, in four of the five northern states, the
percentage of districts providing less than ninety-five percent access was
equivalent to the percentage of districts providing less than seventy-five
percent access in the South. Thus, although there were significant
numbers of districts providing unequal access outside the South, the
inequality was less severe than in the South.
These regional differences, although statistically real, may be misleading. As noted earlier, when significant segregation exists between
districts, districts tend to be more internally homogenous and inequalities are not fully captured by this study’s methodology.279 A careful review of the data suggests that this is exactly what is occurring in the
278 Only one district out of over 600 districts provided less than fifty percent access in
Pennsylvania. (Philadelphia City, 37% access). In Michigan, only four out of over 700 districts provided minorities less than fifty percent access. (Vassar Public Schools, 27% access;
Grand Rapids Public Schools, 40% access; Saginaw City School District, 43% access; Buena
Vista School District, 44% access). In Ohio, only three out of 469 districts provided minorities less than 50% access. (Ohio State School for the Blind, 26%; Lake Local, 39%; Perry
Local, 49%).
279 See Goldin & Katz, supra note 272, at 702.
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northern states. First, the large number of districts and each district’s
relatively small size appear to mask inequality in the North. Michigan
has the most school districts of any state in the study at 734, and its inequality in access is the lowest or nearly the lowest in every category.280
Likewise, Massachusetts has 300 districts (even though its geographic
size is less than a tenth of the size of Michigan).281 In the important
category “Access Below 95%,” Massachusetts’s level is the lowest.
Second, when small northern districts are factored out, the difference between the North and South in racially equitable access disappears. For instance, Ohio has 469 school districts, but many are very
small and racially homogenous.282 In fact, only eighty-two of them have
minority populations that are sufficiently large enough to report minority student achievement without violating privacy requirements.283
When viewed at the district level, Ohio’s inequality in access is the
highest in all but one category in the North, but is lower than southern
states in most other categories. Yet if Ohio’s access is calculated at the
county level, rather than at the district level, Ohio’s inequality of access
nearly mirrors the South.284 In fact, calculated at the county level, Ohio
would have the most unequal access of any state in the study in the categories of “Access Below 75%,” “Access Below 95%,” and “Access Below
100%.” In short, the higher access in the North is likely attributable to
smaller and homogenous districts rather than progressive student assignment policies.
Unfortunately, notwithstanding the foregoing differences in the
extent of inequality, a consistent and reoccurring pattern of unequal
access stretches across all states, as illustrated in Table 2. In fact, three
troubling, but important, patterns arise. First, although relatively small
in number, some districts are providing grossly unequal educational
environments to minority and white students. For instance, Table 2
280 MME Public Demographic Results—Spring 2010, Mich. Dep’t of Educ, http://
www.michigan.gov/mde/0,4615,7-140-22709_35150_47475–-,00.html (click “MME Public
Demographic Results—Spring 2010 to open document) (last visited Feb. 25, 2012).
281 2008–09 Selected Populations Report, Mass. Dep’t of Elementary & Secondary
Educ., http://profiles.doe.mass.edu/state_report/selectedpopulations.aspx?year=2009&
mode=district&Continue.x=4&Continue.y=7 (last visited Feb. 25, 2012) [hereinafter Mass
Data].
282 Disaggregated School Data—Racial/Ethnic, Ohio Dep’t of Educ., http://ilrc.ode.
state.oh.us/Downloads.asp (click “Racial/Ethnic” link to download data) (last visited Feb.
25, 2012) [hereinafter Ohio Data].
283 See Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974, 20 U.S.C. § 1232g (2006).
284 At the county level, 1.5% of Ohio districts provide less than 40% access, 4.5% less
than 50% access, 28.4% less than 75% access, 59.7% less than 95% access, and 73.1% less
than 100% access.
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identifies several districts that assign whites to schools where their peers
are sixty percent or more middle income, while assigning minorities to
schools where the percentage of middle-income students ranks only in
the teens or twenties. Within these single districts, whites and minorities attend schools that, by the numbers, bear absolutely no resemblance to one another.
Table 2: Districts Providing the Most Racially Unequal Access
School District
Atlanta Public Schools (GA)

Mitchell County (GA)
DeKalb County (GA)
Bibb County (GA)
Fulton County (GA)
Hale County (AL)
Marengo County (AL)
Pickens County (AL)
Tuscaloosa City (AL)
Dallas County (AL)
Franklin County (AL)
Monroe County (AL)
Lawrence County (AL)
Philadelphia City (PA)
Mahoning (OH)
Summit (OH)
Hamilton (OH)
Cleveland (MS)
West Jasper (MS)
Greenwood (MS)
Charleston (SC)
Richmond City (VA)

Average White
Student’s Access to
Middle-income peers

Average Minority
Student’s Access to
Middle-income peers

Minority Access as a
Percentage of
White Access

73.20%
48.80%
66.70%
41.30%
82.60%
67.10%
46.20%
61.30%
112.20%
32.80%
53.60%
51.30%
63.70%
33.40%
66.00%
65.80%
72.80%
49.00%
48.00%
33.00%
69.00%
58.40%

15.00%
11.50%
26.10%
17.70%
36.00%
19.60%
13.70%
23.40%
44.40%
13.70%
23.30%
24.50%
30.40%
12.50%
19.50%
29.50%
35.90%
21.00%
21.00%
15.00%
31.10%
26.40%

20.50%
23.60%
39.10%
42.90%
43.60%
29.30%
29.80%
38.20%
39.60%
41.70%
43.50%
47.80%
47.80%
37.30%
29.60%
44.80%
49.40%
42.40%
43.10%
43.80%
44.80%
45.10%

Source: See infra Apps. A, B.

Second, about one out of six districts in nearly half of the states
provides minorities less than seventy-five percent of the access of whites
to middle-income peers. This means that in a typical district, where only a third of the students are poor,285 whites would attend schools that
285 Thirty-five percent of students fall below 150% of the national poverty line, which is
the typical indicator of low-income status. Children Below 150% Poverty 2010, Kids Count
Data Ctr., http://datacenter.kidscount.org/data/acrossstates/Rankings.aspx?ind=46 (last
visited Feb. 19, 2012); see also Susan Aud et al., Nat’l Ctr. for Educ. Statistics, The
Condition of Education 2011, at 86–89 (detailing the percentage of school-age children
living in poverty and the percentage of students by race in high-, middle-, and low-poverty
schools).
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are solidly middle class while minorities attend schools that are predominantly poor, the tipping point for educational barriers.286
Third, in all but five states, one-third to more than one-half of the
districts provide minorities with unequal access (below ninety-five percent). In districts that are solidly middle class or predominantly poor,
unequal access alone may not produce significant changes in the educational environment, but in all of those districts operating on the
margins, inequality in access is enough to make a negative impact on
minority students and an opposite impact on white students. In short,
an alarmingly large percentage of school districts are placing minority
students at educational risk in comparison to whites.
Some districts, however, appear to be doing a good job of equally
exposing students to middle-income peers. Surprisingly, at the state
level, minority students’ exposure to middle-income students in comparison to whites is above ninety percent in all of the states studied except North Carolina and Ohio.287 In fact, the statewide average access is
above ninety-five percent in six of the states.288 This average is high because more than half of the districts provide equal or better access to
minorities in all of the states except two, thus largely counterbalancing,
on the statewide average, the inequalities created elsewhere.289 Yet the
fact that so many districts are doing a relatively good job of providing
equal access at the school building level makes the student assignment
policies in other districts appear even worse. In effect, the large per286 Kahlenberg, supra note 23, at 39–40 (explaining that researchers have defined
high-poverty schools as those where fifty percent of students or more are eligible for free
or reduced-price meals because students in these schools have far lower test scores than
similar students in schools with smaller concentrations of poor students); Michael J. Puma et al., U.S. Dep’t of Educ., Prospects: The Congressionally Mandated Study of
Educational Growth and Opportunity: The Interim Report 77 exh.1.51 (1993)
(demonstrating a precipitous decline in student performance once the percentage of poor
students reaches fifty percent); Puma, supra note 217, at 12 (“School poverty depresses the
scores of all students in schools where at least half of the students are eligible for subsidized lunch, and seriously depresses the scores when over 75 percent of students live in
low-income households.”).
287 North Carolina (Average Minority Access Compared to Whites: 88.7%); Ohio (Average Minority Access Compared to Whites: 87.5%).
288 Massachusetts (95.2%); Virginia (95.6%); Connecticut (97.9%); Michigan (96.5%);
Pennsylvania (96.7%); Mississippi (95.4%).
289 Unfortunately, the percentage of districts providing equal access or better may be
overstated in northern states in particular, where there are far more specially created
school districts that cater to unique or small student populations and there is but one
school in the district. Alternative schools for students who have been suspended are but
one example. This study attempted, where appropriate and possible, to exclude special
purpose school districts.
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centage of districts providing equal access demonstrates, consistent
with this Article’s argument, that racially unequal access to middleincome peers is far from inevitable.
2. Lower Access and Higher Achievement Gaps
Social science stresses the importance of access to middle-income
peers because of the effect this access generally has on achievement.290
The data in this study suggest that this principle holds true in the states
analyzed. As a general matter, those districts with a racially equitable distribution of middle-income students tend to have smaller achievement
gaps (as measured by the percentage of students achieving at or above
grade level on the states’ end-of-year standardized tests). Those with the
least racially equitable distribution of middle-income students tend to
have larger achievement gaps. Figures 1 and 2 graph the achievement
gap between whites and African Americans based on the level of access
that minorities experience in comparison to whites in their district.291
Figure 1:

290 See McUsic, supra note 9, at 1355–56.
291 It is important to note that the number of districts represented in these charts is
smaller than the number of districts in the previous tables because the achievement gap
could not be calculated in several districts due to the unavailability of achievement data.
Presumably the minority populations were too small for the districts to release the data.

2012]

Middle-Income Peers and the Constitutional Right to Equal Access

431

Looking at the southern states, every state except Georgia and
Mississippi shows a dramatic drop in the racial achievement gap from
the districts with the most inequitable distribution to those with
equitable distribution. Mississippi, however, is still consistent with the
overall trend if one compares Mississippi’s “50–59%” access group to
its equal access group (“<100%”). Between these categories, the
achievement gap drops from 20.4 raw percentage points to 13 points.
The nonconforming achievement gaps in Mississippi’s outlier districts
would appear to be a result of demographic and data anomalies in a
few districts, rather than an exception to the overall trend.292
Figure 2:

292 In particular, Mississippi only has five districts providing less than fifty percent access
to minorities. Those districts, however, are overwhelmingly poor and minority. For instance,
Greenwood School District is eighty-four percent poor and whites are only seven percent of
the student population. Thus, although whites have more access to middle-income peers
than minorities, they still attend schools that are predominantly poor and predominantly
minority. Official Net Membership—First Month Enrollment (September), Miss. Dep’t of Educ.,
http://orshome.mde.k12.ms.us/ors/CombIndex2010.html#pupil (last visited Mar. 6, 2012).
It is also worth noting that the achievement gap drop in Mississippi would be even larger were it not for anomalous districts that happen to provide minorities more access than
whites. Mississippi has two districts where minorities are exposed to middle-income peers
at twice the rate of whites. In those two districts, however, the actual percentage of middleincome peers in the average minority student’s school is only eight percent and for whites
it is only three percent. Thus, although the minority access is double that of whites, both
groups attend schools that are more than ninety percent poor, and the real world difference is but a couple of middle-income students in each school. If the districts at this end of
the spectrum were excluded, the achievement gap would drop from 20.4 to 8.5.
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Figure 2 illustrates that the northern states replicate the same general trend as the southern states, with the achievement gap shrinking as
equitable access to middle-income peers increases. The only inconsistencies in this pattern are predictable. In particular, two northern
states—Connecticut and Ohio— experience a significant uptick in the
achievement gap once access for minorities increases beyond equitable
(where minorities experience greater access than whites). These upticks, like the one in Mississippi, correspond with unusual demographic
populations in particular districts and/or insufficient data points in a
particular category of districts. In Ohio, for instance, there are only
three counties with valid data sets where minorities’ access is greater
than whites, and two of those counties have extremely small minority
populations.293 A very large achievement gap in the third skews the
achievement gap upward, and that district is overwhelmingly poor and
minority.294 In effect, just a few white students in this single school district skew the average for the entire state. Similarly, in Connecticut, the
presence of an enormous achievement gap in just a single school district that is almost entirely white and middle income produces an unreliable variation in the achievement gap.295 Finally, some other minor
deviations from the overall trend (of achievement gaps shrinking as
access to middle-income peers becomes more equitable) exist in the
North, but they appear anomalous. For instance, Pennsylvania’s overall
trend is consistent with other states. Its increase in the achievement gap
between the “50–59%” category and the “60–69%” category is attributable to the very small number of districts that fall into these categories
293 Ohio’s achievement gap was calculated at the county level because the achievement
gap was only available about a quarter of the time when calculated at the district level. The
three counties referenced above the line are Medina, Warren, and Fairfield. Medina’s
minority population is only 1.2% of the total, and Warren’s is only 3.5%. See Ohio Data,
supra note 282. Such a small minority population may have other negative effects on
achievement. Diversity studies, in particular, have focused on isolating effects for small
groups and the need for a critical mass. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 319–20
(2003).
294 The achievement gap in Medina was 16.6, whereas in the other two districts there
was no achievement gap for African Americans. See Ohio Data, supra note 282. In fact, African Americans slightly outperformed whites. See id. It is also worth noting that minorities,
at only 1.2% of the population in Medina, were a small group in actual numbers ( just over
300 total students). See id. When those students are spread across a few schools and several
grades, very small fluctuations in the scores of individual students could affect the
achievement gap metric. See id.
295 See, e.g., Sterling, CN (16.8% Poor; 98% White; African-American-White Achievement Gap 34.8); Chester, PA (98% Minority; 88% Poor; Minority-White Achievement Gap:
26.5). The achievement gap in the other district providing minorities equal or better access was only 6.3% and well below districts providing inequitable access.
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and the fact that some of them experience the same demographic
anomalies discussed above.296 Although access disparities nonetheless
exist in these districts, it is not particularly meaningful if one considers
that the difference in one of the representative districts is between attending a school with fifteen percent and seven percent middle-income
peers, which is negligible at best. This study’s methodology, however,
just so happens to identify such districts as supplying heightened access
to minorities. In short, although a few anomalies exist, they are explainable, and the pattern of unequal access and heightened achievement gaps holds true in the North as well as the South.
This pattern is particularly significant given the premise that
smaller and homogenous northern school districts would mask or
make intra-district inequality less relevant. As noted above, northern
district characteristics did appear to decrease the identifiable instances
of inequality in comparison to the South. But the smallness and homogeneity of northern districts was far from sufficient to eliminate inequality altogether or prevent relevant comparisons between achievement gaps across districts and regions. To the contrary, the instances of
inequality were stark at times and reveal that the tendency toward inequality of access to middle-income peers is strong enough that it transcends otherwise important variables. These results only reinforce this
Article’s constitutional focus on intra-district inequality, not just in the
South, but across all regions.
Figures 1 and 2 reveal a troubling overlap between unequal access
and achievement gaps, but they do not fully reveal how large the
downward trend in the achievement gap is when minority students receive equal access. In Massachusetts, for instance, the average achievement gap between African Americans and whites, as measured on the
state standardized exam, is generally very low across districts.297 Thus,
the gap does not have far to fall, and the drop of 4.1 points does not
visually appear large. Yet, as illustrated in Table 3, a 4.1 point drop in
the achievement gap from the districts providing the least equitable
access to middle-income peers to districts providing the most equitable
access represents an 88.8% drop. In other words, the achievement gap
is more than cut in half. In fact, a similarly drastic drop in the achieve296 Only four districts are in the “50–59%” category in Pennsylvania (Erie: 54.12%; Hazelton: 54.25%; Upper Darby: 58.4%; Steel Valley: 59.85%). And Erie, for instance, is
eighty percent poor and majority white. Its black-white achievement gap is only 5.5 points,
notwithstanding racially unequal access to middle-income peers, presumably because students of all races are attending overwhelmingly poor schools.
297 Mass Data, supra note 281.
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ment gap occurs in all of the states except Georgia. In seven states, the
achievement gap drop between inequitable-access districts and equitable-access districts is more than fifty percent, cutting the achievement
gap in half. Why Georgia’s African-American-White achievement gap
does not significantly fall is not entirely clear,298 but interestingly Georgia’s Latino-White achievement gap does drastically drop in these same
districts. In fact, the achievement gap for Latinos entirely disappears at
the point that they receive equal access to middle-income peers, and
Latinos begin to outperform whites when they have more access to
middle-income peers than whites.299
Table 3: Change in African-American Achievement Gap Between Districts Providing
the Most Equitable and Least Equitable Access
State
Alabama
Georgia
Mississippi*
North Carolina
South Carolina
Virginia
Connecticut
Massachusetts
Michigan
Ohio
Pennsylvania

Raw Decline in Achievement
Gap
7.5
0.007
11.9
6
7.3
8.1
10.8
4.1
20.7
5.4
3.6

Percentage of
Change/Decline
59.8%
0.1%
58.3%
20.7%
51.4%
51.3%
34.5%
88.8%
45.5%
56.1%
52.1%

* Those few districts providing less than fifty percent access and those providing 100% or more
access were excluded from Mississippi’s calculations in this table for the reasons discussed
previously regarding the mathematical and demographic anomalies. The comparison in this table
includes all of the districts in between.
Source: See infra Apps. A, B, C.

Although the foregoing analyses makes inequalities and achievement gaps within states and districts clear, comparisons between states
are not obvious because each state uses its own exams and sets its own
threshold for what constitutes passing.300 For instance, in Georgia over
298 As noted above the line, Georgia’s achievement gap includes two spikes and two
drops. Thus, if one compares districts providing less than fifty percent access to those providing less than ninety percent, there is a significant drop in the achievement gap. The
same is true if one compares those districts providing ninety to ninety-five percent access
to those providing more access. Why there is a significant spike from those providing less
than ninety percent access to those providing more is unclear.
299 In the districts with the least access, the gap is 7.2, but falls to 4.5, 2.5, 3.2, 2, 2.5
and -1.75 in the districts with more access. This drop amounts to more than 100%.
300 See Ryan, supra note 216, at 241 (discussing how state standards for passing distort
perceptions of academic success).

2012]

Middle-Income Peers and the Constitutional Right to Equal Access

435

ninety percent of students pass or achieve at grade level on the end-ofyear exams, but in Connecticut the number is just over fifty percent.301
All of the foregoing charts are subject to these fluctuations because
they categorize districts by the amount of middle-income peer access
they provide and then ask what the average achievement gap is in those
districts.
By first identifying the districts with the largest achievements gaps
and then calculating the average access in those districts, that problem
is eliminated. The results, nonetheless, remain consistent with prior
analyses. Those districts with the largest achievement gaps also have the
least equitable access to middle-income peers, and those with the
smallest achievement gaps have the most equitable access to middleincome peers. In fact, while this method effectively eliminates the huge
shifts, the trend itself is more uniform and consistent than the foregoing analyses.
Table 4: Average Access Based on Achievement Gap Quartiles
Access in
Bottom Quartile
Access in
State
(Largest Achieve- Second Quartile
ment Gap)
Alabama
86
90
Georgia
94
88
Mississippi
88
88
North Carolina
83
84
South Carolina
86
97
Virginia
90
87
Connecticut
91
89
Massachusetts
91
94
Michigan
94.8
95
Ohio
92
70
Pennsylvania
94.7
93
Source: See infra Apps. A, B, C.

Access in
Third Quartile
104
93
91
87
92
93
94
96
98
64
96

Access in
Top Quartile
(Smallest Achievement Gap)
98
94
92
99.5
93
97
98
95
100
92
98

Table 4 divides districts into quartiles based on their district-wide
achievement gaps. The districts with the largest achievement gaps provide less access than the districts with the smallest achievement gap in
every state but Ohio. North Carolina’s differential is the most drastic, as
those counties with the largest achievement gaps, on average, provide
minority students access that is only eighty-three percent of what whites
receive, while those districts with the smallest achievement gaps provide
301 Georgia (White Pass Rate: 97%; African-American Pass Rate: 90%); Connecticut
(White Pass Rate: 63%; African-American Pass Rate: 43%).
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minority students access that is almost equivalent to that of whites (99.5
percent). In fact, the districts with the smallest achievement gap in seven of eleven states provide minorities access that is ninety-five percent
or higher. In the remaining four states, access for minorities still well
exceeds ninety percent in districts with the smallest achievement gaps.
Looking at the other end of the achievement gap spectrum, those districts with the smallest achievement gaps are providing access, on average, that is below ninety-five percent that of whites. In short, equality of
access, which this Article treats as ninety-five percent or more access,
serves as a nearly uniform dividing line between districts with the highest and lowest achievement gaps.
Dividing districts by the quartile method used above clearly breaks
districts out into rank order within the state, but a methodology based
on quartiles can produce both huge and miniscule variations in the
achievement gap that are not consistent across quartiles. For instance,
those districts in the quartile with the largest achievement gaps in North
Carolina had gaps ranging from 51.6% to 30.7%, whereas the achievement gaps in the middle two quartiles ranged from 30.5% to 25.1% and
25.1% to 20.7%.
Table 5: Average Access on Standard Deviations in Achievement Gap
More Than
Less Than One
One Standard Between the Average
Standard
Between One
Deviation
Deviation
Standard Deviation
Achievement
Gap
Above the
Below the
Below and the
Score and One
State
Average
Average
Average
Standard
Deviation
Achievement
Achievement Gap Achievement
Above
Gap Score
Gap Score
Score
(Largest Gap)
(Smallest Gap)
Alabama
86
92
103
96
Georgia
90
92
92
99
Mississippi
87
89
92
90
North Carolina
88
85
89
111
South Carolina
74
95
93
91
Virginia
96
93
96
98
Connecticut
92
89
95
98
Massachusetts
92
89
96
92
Michigan
91
97
99
103
Ohio
77
63
86
92
Pennsylvania
99
95
97
98
Source: See infra Apps. A, B, C.

Table 5 groups districts based on their standard deviation from the
statewide average achievement gap, eliminating the problem of random variations within the quartiles (although it also has the potential
to result in small groups). The standard deviation model reveals some
minor differences in individual states from the quartile method in Ta-
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ble 4, but overall the results are largely the same, with access at or above
ninety-two percent representing a dividing line between districts with
the highest and lowest achievement gaps.
In summary, this Article’s study of ten states revealed reoccurring
instances of racially inequitable access to middle-income peers. In some
instances, the inequitable access was so extensive that it amounted to
white students attending predominantly middle-income schools and
minorities attending predominantly poor schools. In most other instances, the inequity was still large enough to expose white and minority students to significantly different peer environments. This inequity is
not inevitable, but rather is likely a result of deliberate school assignment policies, given that a substantial portion of districts in each state
represent the opposite paradigm and provide minorities and whites
equal access to middle-income peers. Although a more sophisticated
analysis would be necessary to specifically identify the cause, the varying levels of inequity in access also coincided with varying racial
achievement gaps. Consistent with other social science studies, this Article’s study found that in all states but one the largest achievement
gaps exist in districts that provide the least equitable access to middleincome peers, and the size of the achievement gap falls as access becomes more equitable. Equal access alone does not coincide with the
elimination of the achievement gap, but it coincides with drastic reductions in the gap. The achievement gap dropped by approximately fifty
percent or more in seven of the eleven states.
Conclusion
Efforts to promote racial and socioeconomic equity through student assignments have largely come to an end in federal court and only
amounted to a few—albeit important—cases in state courts. The problems in federal court are tied to relatively well-settled negative precedent, but the same is not true in regard to state claims. The failure of a
movement to emerge in state court may be more the result of perception and strategy than doctrine and reality. Insofar as advocates and
theorists have sought to use state constitutions as a way to avoid federal
doctrinal problems or simply replicate federal claims in state court under a new name, state-based theories of integration may confront the
same political and practical limitations they would in federal court.
Thus, although the theory of these integration claims may be valid in
some states, it is no surprise that most advocates and the few courts that
have heard the cases have been tepid.

438

Boston College Law Review

[Vol. 53:373

A halting past, however, does not foreclose the future of state constitutions as an engine of racial equity in student assignments. Rather, it
highlights the need for claims that are distinct from traditional integration and conceptually grounded in school finance precedent. This Article’s theory of equitable access to middle-income peers entails both. It
is distinct in that equitable access to middle-income peers focuses on
segregation within districts rather than between them and does not
necessarily challenge historical district boundaries. Thus, it avoids many
of the political and administrative complications that have undermined
prior advocacy. Also, the focus on school-level segregation provides factually distinct circumstances. Local assignment policies fluctuate over
time and involve conscious decisions, whereas state-level policy regarding districts is more static.302 A more compelling set of facts naturally
arises with the former.
A theory of equal access to middle-income peers proceeds at the
district level, however, not simply to distinguish itself; it proceeds at the
district level because it is there that it finds analytical and precedential
strength. Courts may be quick to excuse inequalities that are beyond
the control of districts,303 but they are far less willing to overlook those
inequalities within districts’ control. Some inequalities that stem from
the fact that a district is predominantly poor or minority may be largely
beyond the control of local school districts. But other inequalities within a district are often a result of district and school policies and, thus,
are neither natural nor inevitable. Access to middle-income peers falls
in this latter category of inequalities that are within districts’ control.
Once one understands that middle-income students are one of the
many resources districts distribute, the equitable and strategic distribution of resources that school finance precedent has forced on schools
and districts is directly implicated. Of course, no court has yet explicitly
conceptualized middle-income students as resources, but a review of
social science literature, as well as the differing academic achievement
that accompanies exposure to middle-income peers, proves the concept to be true. Courts already intuit this notion, heavily scrutinizing
and condemning the prevailing poor performance of districts with
concentrated poverty. And parents already act on it, often flocking to
schools based more on the socioeconomic status of the students who
302 This, however, is not to say that states have not acted to change district boundaries
in ways that increase segregation. See, e.g., Evans v. Buchanan, 393 F. Supp. 428, 438–40 (D.
Del. 1975).
303 Evans v. Buchanan, 416 F. Supp. 328, 352–53 (D. Del. 1976) (ordering inter-district
desegregation remedy due to government manipulation of enrollment patterns).
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attend them than the characteristics of the school facility or the particular staff who teach in them. Once explicit legal analysis catches up to
reality and intuition, state constitutional education precedent will
squarely apply.
This final step cannot occur soon enough. Far too many districts
are depriving minority students of equal access to a key educational resource that will significantly affect their academic achievement. No silver bullets exist in education and much about student achievement is
beyond the control of states, districts, and schools. Thus, simply providing equal access will not obliterate these outside factors. But equal access can significantly mitigate their effects. No less than basic equality
principles and state constitutional precedent demand as much.
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Appendices
Appendix A: Enrollment Data Sources
State
Alabama

Source
2008–2009 Alabama High School Graduation Exam, Ala. St. Dep’t of Educ.,

http://www.alsde.edu/Accountability/Accountability.asp (last visited Feb. 28,
2012).
Connecticut
2000–2010 Public School Enrollment by Resident Town, Conn. St. Dep’t of Educ.,
http://sdeportal.ct.gov/Cedar/WEB/ct_report/EnrollmentDT.aspx (last visited
Feb. 28, 2012).
Georgia
2009 Enrollment by Race/Ethnicity, Gender and Grade Level (PK–12), Ga. Dep’t of
Educ., http://app3.doe.k12.ga.us/owsbin/owa/fte_pack_ethnicsex.entry_form
(last visited Feb. 28, 2012).
Massachusetts 2008–09 Selected Populations Report, Mass. Dep’t of Elementary & Secondary
Educ. (ESE), http://profiles.doe.mass.edu/state_report/selectedpopulations
.aspx?year=2009&mode=district&Continue.x=4&Continue.y=7 (last visited Feb.
28, 2012).
Michigan
MME Public Demographic Results—Spring 2010, Mich. Dep’t of Educ.,
http://www.michigan.gov/mde/0,4615,7-140-22709_35150_47475---,00.html (last
visited Feb. 28, 2012).
Mississippi
2008–2009 Official Net Membership—First Month Enrollment (September), Miss. Dep’t
of Educ., http://orshome.mde.k12.ms.us/ors/CombIndex2010.html
#pupil (last visited Mar. 6, 2012).
North Carolina Disaggregated Performance Data for 2008–2009, N.C. Pub. Sch.,
http://accrpt.ncpublicschools.org/docs/disag_datasets/ (click link to download
zip file) (last visited Feb. 28, 2012).
Ohio
2008–2009 Disaggregated School Data—Racial/Ethnic, Ohio.gov,
http://ilrc.ode.state.oh.us/Downloads.asp (last visited Feb. 28, 2012).
Pennsylvania
2009–10 School Level Math and Reading PSSA Results—School Totals, Pa. Dep’t of
Educ., http://www.portal.state.pa.us/portal/server.pt/community/school_ass
essments/7442/2009_- (last visited Feb. 28, 2012).
South Carolina 2009 State Report Card, S.C. St. Dep’t of Educ., http://ed.sc.gov/data/reportcards/2009/index.cfm (click each individual district to obtain data) (last visited
Mar. 6, 2012).
Virginia
2008–2009 Fall Membership Reports, Va. Dep’t of Educ.,
http://www.doe.virginia.gov/statistics_reports/enrollment/fall_membership/ind
ex.shtml (last visited Feb. 28, 2012).
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Appendix B: Poverty Data Sources
State
Alabama
Connecticut
Georgia
Massachusetts

Michigan
Mississippi
North Carolina
Ohio
Pennsylvania
South Carolina
Virginia

Source
2008–2009 Alabama High School Graduation Exam, Ala. St. Dep’t of Educ.,
http://www.alsde.edu/Accountability/Accountability.asp (last visited Feb. 28,
2012).
2008–2009 Students Eligible for Free/Reduced Price Lunch, Conn. St. Dep’t of

Educ., http://sdeportal.ct.gov/Cedar/WEB/ct_report/Student
NeedDTViewer.aspx (last visited Feb. 28, 2012).
2009 Free and Reduced Price Meal Eligibility, Ga. Dep’t of Educ.,
http://app3.doe.k12.ga.us/owsbin/owa/fte_pack_frl001_public.entry_form
(last visited Feb. 28, 2012).
2008–09 Selected Populations Report, Mass. Dep’t of Elementary &
Secondary Educ. (ESE), http://profiles.doe.mass.edu/state_report/select
edpopulations.aspx?year=2009&mode=district&Continue.x=4&Continue.y
=7 (last visited Feb. 28, 2012).
2008–09 Free and Reduced Lunch Counts, Michigan.gov,
http://www.michigan.gov/cepi/0,4546,7-113-21423_30451_36965---,00.html
(last visited Feb. 28, 2012).
2008–2009 Official Net Membership—First Month Enrollment (September), Miss.
Dep’t of Educ., http://orshome.mde.k12.ms.us/ors/CombIndex
2010.html#pupil (last visited Mar. 6, 2012).
Dissaggregated Performance Data for 2008–2009, N.C. Pub. Sch.,
http://accrpt.ncpublicschools.org/docs/disag_datasets/ (click link to report
to download zip file) (last visited Feb. 28, 2012).
2009--2010 Disaggregated Data—Economic Status, Ohio.gov, http://ilrc.
ode.state.oh.us/Downloads.asp (last visited Feb. 28, 2012).
2009–10 School Level Math and Reading PSSA Results—School Totals, Pa. Dep’t
of Educ., http://www.portal.state.pa.us/portal/server.pt/comm
unity/school_assessments/7442/2009_- (last visited Feb. 28, 2012).
2009 State Report Card, S.C. St. Dep’t of Educ.,
http://ed.sc.gov/data/report-cards/2009/index.cfm (last visited Mar. 6,
2012).
National School Lunch Program (NSLP) Free and Reduced Price Eligibility Report—by
School Divisions 2008–2009, Va. Dep’t of Educ.,
http://www.doe.virginia.gov/support/nutrition/statistics/index.shtml (last
visited Feb. 28, 2012).
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Appendix C: Achievement Gap Data Sources
State
Alabama
Connecticut
Georgia

Massachusetts
Michigan

Mississippi
North Carolina
Ohio
Pennsylvania
South Carolina
Virginia

Source
2008–2009 Alabama High School Graduation Exam, Math Scores, Ala. St.

Dep’t of Educ., http://www.alsde.edu/Accountability/Accountabili
ty.asp/ (last visited Feb. 28, 2012).
2008–2009 CMT Math G8 Achievement Test, eMetric, http://solutions1
.emetric.net/cmtpublic/Default.aspx (last visited Mar. 8, 2012).
2009 Georgia High School Graduation Test (Percent Passing in Math Scores), St. of
Ga., http://archives.gadoe.org/ReportingFW.aspx?PageReq=211&PI
D=61&PTID=67&CTID=217&SchoolId=ALL&T=0 (last visited Mar. 8,
2012).
2009 MCAS High School Exit Tests: District Results, Mass.gov,
http://www.doe.mass.edu/mcas/results.html?yr=2009 (last visited Feb. 28,
2012).
MME Public Demographic Results—Spring 2010, Mich. Dep’t of Educ.,
http://www.michigan.gov/mde/0,4615,7-140-22709_35150_47475---,00.html
(click “MME Public Demographic Results —Spring 2010” to download file)
(last visited Feb. 28, 2012).
2008/2009 Subject Area Testing Program, Miss. Dep’t of Educ.,
http://orshome.mde.k12.ms.us/ors/assessment/2009/index.html#nclb (last
visited Feb. 28, 2012).
State/LEA and School Test Performance 2008–2009, N.C. Pub. Sch.,
http://accrpt.ncpublicschools.org/docs/disag_datasets/ (last visited Feb. 28,
2012).
2009--2010 Disaggregated School Data—Racial/Ethnic, Ohio.gov,
http://ilrc.ode.state.oh.us/Downloads.asp (last visited Feb. 28, 2012).
2009–10 School Level Math and Reading PSSA Results—School Totals, Pa. Dep’t of
Educ., http://www.portal.state.pa.us/portal/server.pt/co
mmunity/school_assessments/7442/2009_- (last visited Feb. 28, 2012).
EOCEP (End-of-Course Examination Program)—2008–2009, S.C. St. Dep’t of
Educ., http://ed.sc.gov/data/eocep/index.cfm (last visited Feb. 28, 2012).
Virginia Assessment Results, Va. Dep’t of Educ., https://p1pe.doe.
virginia.gov/datareports/assess_test_result.do (last visited Feb. 28, 2012).

